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I. Introduction 
Racecar driver Scott Tucker leads an opulent life, which 
includes enjoying an $8 million vacation home in Colorado, to which 
he travels by a $13 million Lear Jet.1 Much of Tucker’s vast wealth 
                                                                                                     
 1. David Heath, Payday Lending Bankrolls Auto Racer’s Fortune, IWATCH 
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has been amassed through internet payday lending businesses, 
which he operates from his office in Overland Park, Kansas.2 He 
evades state lending laws by partnering with Indian tribes with 
tribal sovereign immunity, yet the contrast between his lifestyle and 
the tribes with which he partners could hardly be more stark.3 
These partnerships call into question who actually controls these 
loan businesses and whether they represent a legitimate use of the 
sovereign immunity tribes have worked so hard to protect. 
This Article discusses the most recent incarnation of payday 
lending regulation-avoidance, which pits tribal sovereign immunity 
against meaningful consumer protection laws. Under this model, 
known among internet payday lenders as the “tribal sovereignty” 
model, existing payday lenders team with Indian tribes in order to 
gain the benefit of tribal sovereign immunity and avoid state usury 
laws, small loan regulations, and payday loan laws.4 This practice 
could conceivably weaken both tribal sovereignty and consumer 
protection in one fell swoop.  
For Indian tribes, sovereignty is a fundamentally important 
concept. Tribal sovereignty is retained from prior to European 
contact, but is subject to the power of Congress.5 Sovereignty is a 
tribe’s power to self-govern and functions as a barrier to the 
encroachment of foreign authority on Indian reservations.6 
Sovereign immunity is a corollary of tribal sovereignty, and protects 
tribes from enforcement of state law.7  
Consumer protection is also a matter of deep significance to 
many Americans, particularly in this historic time of deregulated 
interest rates, complex consumer credit products, and record debt 
levels. One context in which consumer regulation has been difficult 
                                                                                                     
NEWS (Sept. 26, 2011, 4:00 PM), http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/09/26/6605/ 
payday-lending-bankrolls-auto-racers-fortune (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4.  See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text (discussing the typical 
sovereign model of partnerships between payday lenders and tribes). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing the history and limits of tribal 
sovereignty). 
 6. Id.  
 7. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the basic principles of sovereign 
immunity). 
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to achieve is that of payday loans, high-interest products marketed 
for short-term use, but more typically used for very long periods of 
time, during which consumers often pay ten times what they 
borrowed and have difficulty exiting the loans. Payday lenders are 
adept at avoiding any regulations states pass, and there is no 
federal law regulating most of the terms of payday loans. Thus, in 
the rare instances in which states pass meaningful payday loan 
regulations, lenders quickly find new ways to avoid those state laws.  
This Article explores how tribal sovereign immunity is being 
used in the context of payday lending to avoid state law and 
explores the ramifications of this for both consumer-protection 
regulation and tribes. It discusses payday loans and tribal 
sovereignty generally, as well as tribal sovereign immunity, then 
discusses what might be done to address this consumer protection 
issue. More specifically, we discuss who in society has the power and 
resolve to dissolve this alliance, identifying tribes themselves, the 
Supreme Court, Congress, the Federal Trade Commission, and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as possibilities.  
We summarize the debate about whether payday lending 
regulation will cause more harm than good by depriving the poor of 
much-needed capital,8 and recount examples of state regulatory 
efforts that have taken place. We describe the ways that lenders are 
teaming with tribes to avoid that regulation, and then discuss the 
long-term implications of these developments, both for consumer 
protection and for tribal sovereignty. 
II. Background on the Economics of Tribal Life 
Some journalists with a consumer protection bent have painted 
tribes as the greedy beneficiaries of these high interest loans, 
conjuring up images of a gloating tribal member getting rich off the 
non-tribal poor.9 In reality, this is simply not true. First, Native 
                                                                                                     
 8. Though we believe meaningful payday loan regulation is sorely needed, 
this paper does not focus its attention on this issue. 
 9. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Tribes Profit on Payday-Loan Rules, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 10, 2011, at C1 (reporting on the growth of the “sovereign-loan 
model” and the economic incentives it brings to tribes). But see Michael Hudson 
& David Heath, Fights Over Tribal Payday Lenders Show Challenges of 
Financial Reform, IWATCH NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011, 9:13 AM), 
http://www.iwatchnews.org/2011/02/07/2151/fights-over-tribal-payday-lenders-
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people also use these loans. In one recent case, a New Mexico 
woman borrowed $5,000 under a loan that required she pay back 
$42,000.10 Second, in many of these lender–tribe partnerships, tribal 
sovereignty is being used in ways that benefit only non-tribal 
individuals. Thus, characterizations like those in the popular media 
are almost completely false. These false characterizations could 
cause short-term and long-term harm to tribes, by painting an 
inaccurate economic picture, and even by threatening tribal 
independence and sovereignty itself. 
To understand the importance of sovereignty from a tribal 
perspective, one must also understand the economics for most 
tribes. Poverty is more prevalent among Native people than any 
other American demographic.11 Following efforts by the federal 
government and Euro-American settlers to dislocate and remove the 
Indian tribes from their territories,12 many tribes now reside in 
rural areas with limited development of natural resources.13 
                                                                                                     
show-challenges-financial-reform (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (describing tribes’ 
willingness to profit from payday lending as a result of being “stripped of their 
economic vitality and forced to relocate to remote wastelands”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Mark Fogarty, Payday Lenders ‘Using Tribes 
as Fronts’, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/02/14/payday-lenders-‘using-
tribes-as-fronts’-17421 (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (objectively reporting on the 
publication of a report that investigates payday lender arrangements with 
tribes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 10. Native Community Finance, a community development corporation 
located on the Laguna Pueblo, recently provided a loan to pay off an internet 
payday loan given by Western Sky Loans. Under the terms of the loan, the 
consumer would have paid back $42,000 to borrow $5,000. The consumer told 
the executive director of Native American Finance that she thought the loan 
was O.K. because it was being offered by a tribe.  See interview with Marvin 
Ginn, Exec. Dir., Native Am. Fin. (Oct. 2, 2011). 
 11. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A QUIET CRISIS: FEDERAL FUNDING 
AND UNMET NEEDS IN INDIAN COUNTRY 8 (2003), available at http://www.usccr. 
gov/pubs/na0703/na0204.pdf (“[T]he national poverty rate in the Unites States 
for the period between 1999 and 2001 was 11.6 percent. For Native Americans 
nationally, the average annual poverty rate was 24.5 percent.”). 
 12. See Kelly E. Yasaitis, NAGPRA: A Look Back Through the Litigation, 
25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 259, 260–61 (2005) (recounting the treatment 
of Native Americans in the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries). 
 13. See Nancy B. Collins & Andrea Hall, Nuclear Waste in Indian Country: 
A Paradoxical Trade, 12 LAW & INEQ. 267, 300 (1994) (describing tribal 
involvement in nuclear waste as a result of “legal policies that created a system 
of remote reservations, and restricted resource development”). 
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Unemployment tops 50% in many areas,14 and access to quality 
healthcare can be very limited.15 One significant bright light for 
tribes in recent history has been economic development. Many 
people, both Native and non-Native, think this may ameliorate 
poverty and the social problems that accompany it. Nevertheless, 
the stereotype of a tribe getting rich off casinos and paying no taxes 
could hardly be further from the truth.16 Contrary to the popular 
conception, most tribes are still poorer than other U.S. communities, 
despite recent economic development.17  
                                                                                                     
 14. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 101 (noting that 
unemployment has reached eighty-five percent on some reservations and that in 
2000, unemployment on reservations was more than twice the national rate). 
 15. See Armen H. Merjian, Unbroken Chain of Injustice: The Dawes Act, 
Native American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 609, 611–12 
(2010). As Professor Merjian states:  
Native Americans are, in truth, among the very poorest Americans. 
As the United States Civil Rights Commission explains, “Native 
Americans still suffer higher rates of poverty, poor educational 
achievement, substandard housing, and higher rates of disease and 
illness. Native Americans continue to rank at or near the bottom of 
nearly every social, health, and economic indicator.” Fully 23.6% of 
Native Americans live below the poverty line, and 34% of Native 
American children live in families with household incomes below the 
poverty line. Roughly 90,000 Native American families are homeless 
or under-housed, and nearly half of reservation households are 
crowded or severely crowded. One in five of those houses lacks 
adequate plumbing facilities. 
Native Americans have a lower life expectancy than any other ethnic 
group in the United States, and they suffer higher rates of illness for 
many diseases. “On average, men in Bangladesh can expect to live 
longer than Native American men in South Dakota.” Elderly Native 
Americans are 48.7% more likely to suffer from heart failure, 173% 
more likely to suffer from diabetes, and 44.3% more likely to suffer 
from asthma than the general population. Meanwhile, one in three 
Native Americans lacks health insurance coverage. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 16. See Steven Andrew Light & Kathryn R.L. Rand, Reconciling the 
Paradox of Tribal Sovereignty: Three Frameworks for Developing Indian 
Gaming Law and Policy, 4 NEV. L.J. 262, 262–64 (2003) (discussing and 
negating various popular media portrayals of Native Americans as wealthy 
gaming tribes). 
 17. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 8 (“[T]he national 
poverty rate in the Unites States for the period between 1999 and 2001 was 11.6 
percent. For Native Americans nationally, the average annual poverty rate was 
24.5 percent.”). 
PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES 757 
Moreover, joint enterprises sometimes provide asymmetrical 
economic gains for non-Native businesses while significant collateral 
costs are borne by tribal lands and members. The costs borne by the 
tribes can be of great consequence relative to the rewards.18 For 
example, uranium mining has resulted in far fewer economic 
benefits than anticipated, and has caused cancer and black lung 
among Navajos who live and work near the mines.19 Uranium 
mining is also ruinous to the surrounding land and groundwater.20 
Some tribes have been convinced to take nuclear waste for disposal 
on their lands, even though the compensation received is 
significantly undermined by future health and environmental 
ramifications, and by inherent risk.21 The tribal competitive 
advantage in business often consists of providing an easier or less 
                                                                                                     
 18. Casinos are, overall, a significant economic boon to tribes, funding 
tribal language revitalization programs, tribal cultural institutions, and schools, 
among other programs. Yet, some argue that involvement with casinos can 
sometimes chip away at ancient tribal customs. Others find nothing unusual 
about casinos and find that they do not harm Native culture any more than any 
other enterprise. See Karin Mika, Private Dollars on the Reservation: Will 
Recent Native American Economic Development Amount to Cultural 
Assimilation?, 25 N.M. L. REV. 23, 33 (1995) (“Tribes disagree on how much 
cultural purity will be compromised by ‘nontraditional’ enterprises if outside 
entities are allowed to develop businesses on reservation lands.”). 
 19. See Collins & Hall, supra note 13, at 294–95 (discussing the negative 
health and environmental impacts of uranium mining on Native American 
lands); see also Terri Hansen, Proposed Alaska Coal Mine Divides Alaska 
Communities, Elicits Racist Rant, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK 
(Sept. 19, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/09/proposed-
alaska-coal-mine-divides-alaska-communities-elicits-racist-rant/ (last visited 
Apr. 10, 2012) (describing the negative impacts of mining on the health and land 
of Alaskan tribes) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Carol 
Berry, Mining Clashed with Sacred Sites in 2010, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA 
NETWORK (Dec. 27, 2010), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/12/ 
mining-clashed-with-sacred-sites-in-2010/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting 
on the potential environmental, health, and cultural damage caused by uranium 
and coal mines) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); A Lump of 
Coal for ANCs, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 27, 2010), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2010/12/a-lump-of-coal-for-ancs/ 
(last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (reporting on proposed legislation to address abuses 
in preferential government contracts and quoting Senator McCaskill as saying, 
“[w]e’ve seen that a very small portion of these companies’ profits are reaching 
native Alaskans”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 20. See Collins & Hall, supra note 13, at 295 (explaining the environmental 
impacts of uranium mining). 
 21. See id. at 274–75 (discussing the incentives and consequences to tribes 
for accepting nuclear waste onto their land). 
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costly regulatory environment in matters regulated by states.22 
Moreover, it goes without saying that tribes are as diverse as any 
group of people in the country, and there is naturally no consensus 
among Native people about what constitutes good or bad economic 
development.23 Off-reservation business activity can also cause 
backlash from outsiders.24 It is from this social, historical, and 
economic climate that the partnership between tribes and payday 
lenders emerged. 
III. Background on Payday Loans 
A. Anatomy of a Payday Loan 
A payday loan is a loan designed to get a consumer through a 
short-term cash-flow shortage.25 These loans were originally created 
in order to help consumers make ends meet between now and 
payday, thus the descriptive name.26 In reality there are now many 
varieties of short-term loans of this kind, and the loan terms vary 
markedly. In one common example, a consumer borrows money at a 
rate of between $15 and $25 per $100 for a period of fourteen days 
or fewer.27 In other words, if a consumer got paid four days ago but 
is already out of cash, she can go borrow, for example, $400 between 
                                                                                                     
 22. This is especially true of tribes that are economically vulnerable. Tribes 
with more economic resources have more options: They are able to be more 
discerning and to use the full range of their resources, including capital, to 
create opportunities. 
 23. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Tribal Businesses and the Off-
Reservation Market, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1047, 1049–50 (2008) (describing 
various off-reservation businesses, the controversy behind these businesses, and 
the possibility of backlash from the outside as a result). 
 24. See id. 
 25. See Ronald Mann & James Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. 
REV. 855, 857 (2007) (explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Karen 
E. Francis, Note, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics Analysis 
of the Payday Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2010) (describing a 
payday loan transaction). 
 26. See Mann & Hawkins, supra note 25, at 857 (“The spirit of the market 
is captured by a recent Cash America television advertisement advising that 
‘some things can’t wait until payday.’”). 
 27. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A 
Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010) 
(giving an example of a typical payday loan). 
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now and her next payday (now ten days away). To get that $400 at 
the $15-per-$100 rate, she will need to have a checking account and 
will write a check, or authorize an automatic debit, for $460 post-
dated to her next payday.28 When payday comes, she can either let 
the check or debit clear, or she can go in and pay another $60 to 
borrow the same $400 for the next two weeks. Interest rates for 
these loans range from around 400% per annum to over 1,200%, and 
the industry is largely unregulated in most of the country.29 Payday 
lending is one of the fastest growing segments of the consumer 
credit industry.30 As Francis notes, “[b]y 2005, there were more 
payday-loan stores in the United States than McDonald’s, Burger 
King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target stores combined.”31  
B. The Debate over Payday Lending Regulation 
An active debate rages about whether these loans do more 
harm than good. Consumer groups claim these loans create a debt 
trap.32 Lender groups, perhaps with some justification, point out 
that people of lesser means have no place else to go when they really 
need cash.33 They claim that restricting access to the only source of 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. at 565 (citing Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the 
Day, REUTERS (Jan. 6, 2010, 7:37 PM), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-datapoints-of-the-day/ (last visited Apr. 10, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 30. See Francis, supra note 25, at 618–19 (describing the growth of the 
payday lending industry). 
 31. Id. at 619. 
 32. See LESLIE PARRISH & URIAH KING, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
PHANTOM DEMAND: SHORT-TERM DUE DATES GENERATE NEED FOR REPEAT  PAYDAY 
LOANS, ACCOUNTING FOR 76% OF TOTAL VOLUME 15–16 (2009), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-
demand-final.pdf (demonstrating how the structure of payday loans creates a 
debt-trap for borrowers); LAUREN K. SANDERS ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW 
CENTER, STOPPING THE PAYDAY LOAN TRAP: ALTERNATIVES THAT WORK, ONES THAT 
DON’T 4–6 (2010), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_ 
loans/payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-trap.pdf (describing payday loans 
and the harms they cause for consumers); Francis, supra note 25, at 612 
(describing how consumers may get “caught in the ‘debt trap’ of extending the 
loan for multiple terms”). 
 33. See Francis, supra note 25, at 617 (noting that “the payday-lending 
industry claims to provide a valuable service to consumers who are in need of 
emergency cash and do not have access to other credit”); see also John P. 
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capital for people of lesser means will only make people’s problems 
worse.34 
Some of the most harmful aspects of this problem have nothing 
to do with interest rates and everything to do with how the loans are 
marketed and used. We personally might look favorably upon a loan 
product that allowed people who could not otherwise get credit to 
borrow money for occasional, unexpected, non-recurring expenses. 
Though some consumer groups disagree, we believe that this could 
be a good and useful product even if it cost $25 for every $100 
borrowed.35 In other words, the high relative cost of loans might not 
matter so much if loans were truly short term, both in design and 
marketing, as well as in actual use.  
C. The Habits of Payday Lenders and Customers 
In reality, these loans are rarely short term or occasional. 
Empirical data show that the loans are often used habitually.36 
                                                                                                     
Caskey, Payday Lending: New Research and the Big Question 3 (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010), available at 
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
papers/2010/wp10-32.pdf (noting that payday lenders serve people of lesser 
means but not the very poor). 
 34. See Francis, supra note 25, at 613 (describing the arguments made by 
proponents and critics of payday lending regulations). 
 35. Consumer groups object to payday lending for reasons other than the 
high cost. As Jen Ann Fox of the Consumer Federation of America explained, in 
response to this view: 
We object to payday loan structure and design for many reasons other 
than the cost, i.e. loans made without determination of ability to 
repay, loans secured by access to bank accounts, balloon payment 
loans, loans too large to be repaid out of one paycheck even if free, 
loans based on unfunded checks leading to coercive debt collection 
tactics, etc. As studies from the Center for Responsible Lending show, 
even if the loans were used only now and then, this does not mean 
that high cost is the only issue. If all the factors that go into a payday 
loan resulted in only occasional use, this would not be a significant 
problem, but these are not the same things.  
Online interview with Ms. Fox (Oct. 18, 2011).  
 36. Caskey, supra note 33, at 4–5. Professor Caskey does a thorough review 
of recent studies on repeat usage of payday loans, stating that: 
Stegman’s 2007 article made this same point and provided data 
indicating that many payday loan customers borrow repeatedly. More 
recent data reinforce this finding. A study for the California 
Department of Corporations found, for example, that 19 percent of 
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According to one source, the average loan is rolled over ten times, 
and some consumers pay on the same loan for years at a time.37 
                                                                                                     
loan customers took out 15 or more loans over an 18- month period. 
Only 16 percent took out just one. The study also included focus 
groups with a small number of customers. Based on the focus groups, 
the study reported, “When asked if they would recommend payday 
loans to others, most indicated that they would provide the 
information about payday lending, but would also provide cautions to 
the ‘addictive’, ‘repetitive’, and ‘vicious’ cycle that can be a part of the 
payday lending experience.” In Colorado during 2007, payday loan 
customers with 12 or more loans accounted for 67 percent of all loans; 
65 percent of loans were made on the same day that a customer 
repaid a previous loan. As the Colorado report stated, “During 2007 
the ‘average’ consumer paid about $573.06 in total finance charges to 
have borrowed $353.88 for a period of little more than five and one-
half months at each . . . location with which that consumer did 
business.” 
Data from Florida indicate that the average number of transactions 
per consumer from June 2008 through May 2009 was 8.4, and 30 
percent of the customers in that ear had 12 loans or more. These 30 
percent of customers accounted for 61 percent of all payday loans 
made in that year. In Oklahoma, the average number of transactions 
per customer was 9.3 from April 2008 through March 2009, 32.5 
percent of the customers in that year took out 12 or more loans, 
accounting for 63.5 percent of loan volume. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 37. See Allison Woolston, Note, Neither a Borrower Nor a Lender Be: The 
Future of Payday Lending in Arizona, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 853, 867 (2010) (“This 
repeated cycle of loan renewal extends the duration of payday loan to an 
average of almost five months. The typical payday loan customer renews his 
loan approximately ten times and, in one reported instance sixty-six times.”); see 
also Francis, supra note 25, at 617. In this student note, Ms. Francis cites a 
number of studies about rollovers being repeat loans, stating that:  
The average borrower has 10, 11, or 12 payday transactions per year 
according to three respective reports. A Colorado study found that the 
average was greater than 9 transactions per year from the same 
lender, but that did not include transactions that a borrower may 
have had with other lenders, which the study implied could greatly 
increase that average. In Illinois, 20% of borrowers have 20 or more 
payday loans per year. A consumer advocate group found that 66% 
incur at least 5 payday loans per year and that 31% receive more 
than 12 per year. The Georgetown study reported that almost 50% of 
borrowers had at least 7 transactions in the last year and that 22.5% 
had more than 14 payday loans that year. Though none of the data 
converged, all of these studies reveal a high rate of rollover 
transactions per borrower. The striking feature of this data is that 
the CFSA study, which should be most favorable to the payday-
lending industry, shows that almost a majority of all borrowers are 
rolling over their loans multiple times. 
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Moreover, the loans are most frequently used to pay regular, 
recurring bills like rent and utilities, not emergencies.38 This means 
that once a person has borrowed the money, if he or she cannot pay 
it back with the fee, he or she now has another monthly or 
bimonthly bill to pay.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, it is hard for a lender to make a profit 
from occasional, non-recurring customers. Thus, lender marketing 
typically encourages customers to use the loans for many non-
emergency purposes. Advertisements suggest that the loans are a 
perfect way to fund vacations,39 Christmas and birthday presents, 
and even bachelor parties.40 In other words, while lenders claim that 
they are here when tragedy hits and that their customers would be 
harmed if they faced an emergency, many of the loans are used for 
discretionary purposes at a cost that customers do not understand 
until it is too late. 
Similar to any product, gimmicks abound in payday loan 
advertising. The idea is to attract new customers but to rely heavily 
on repeat business.41 One payday lender uses stripper Bridget the 
Midget as its mascot in order to demonstrate that the loans are for 
                                                                                                     
Id. (citations omitted). 
 38. See Caskey, supra note 33, at 6 (describing a 2007 California survey 
which found that “50.2 percent of loan customers said that they took the loan 
primarily to pay bills, and 22.3 percent said that they mainly used it to buy 
groceries or other household goods”) (citing APPLIED MGMT. & PLANNING GRP., 
2007 DEPARTMENT OF CORPORATIONS PAYDAY LOAN STUDY 47 (2007), available at 
http://www.corp.ca.gov/pub/pdf/PDLStudy07C.pdf). Martin has found that 63% 
of customers reported using the loans for regular bills in her survey outside 
store-front lenders’ places of business. Martin, supra note 27, at 608–09.  
Another 4% reported using the loans for discretionary purposes such as gifts or 
parties, and just 5% for emergencies, 5% for auto expenses, 5% to help family, 
and 5% for medical expenses. Id. 
 39. See Using a Payday Loan for Vacation Expenses, PAYDAY LOAN BLOG 
(Sept. 29, 2008, 10:19 AM), http://www.paydayloanaffiliate.com/blog/ 
UsingAPaydayLoanForVacationExpenses.aspx (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) 
(advocating the use of a payday loan to fund a vacation) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 40. See Nathalie Martin, Funding Your Buddy’s Bachelor Party Through a 
Payday Loan?, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 25, 2011, 6:32 PM), http://www.credit 
slips.org/creditslips/2011/03/funding-your-buddys-bachelor-party-through-a-pay 
day-loan.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (linking to a payday loan ad) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 41. See PARRISH & KING, supra note 32, at 2–3 (describing the “churning” of 
borrows and noting that such churning accounts for three-fourths of all payday 
loan volume). 
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“short” term use.42 Despite the clever play on words, lenders dun 
customers to take out new loans almost immediately after they pay 
back an old one.43 Lenders call customers in their cars on their way 
home from paying off or paying down the loan.44 Lenders waive one 
two-week fee if you keep your loan out for four two-week cycles in a 
row.45 In fact, if a customer can afford to pay back the whole loan, 
without resorting to rollovers, lenders offer to increase the amount 
enough to make sure that this never happens again. In other words, 
lenders do whatever they legally can to make sure the loans are 
neither infrequent nor short term. 
Whatever problems are created by storefront payday loans, the 
problems with internet payday loans appear to be far worse. 
Interest rates are more commonly in the 600%–1,000% range, 
rather than the 400%–600% range, and the loans are largely 
unregulated.46 Some lenders who operate over the internet 
consistently claim that they are not bound by any state’s law.47 
Customers give large amounts of personal data to the lender over 
the internet before they hear any of the loan terms.48 The lenders’ 
                                                                                                     
 42. Little Payday, Bridget the Midget Introduces Small Loans at 
LittlePayday.com!, YOUTUBE (Sept. 19, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
6euwvEQxm6c (last visited Jan. 7, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 43. See PARRISH & KING, supra note 32, at 2 (“Devoting [a] substantial 
share of paycheck to repaying a payday loan, it appears, leaves most borrowers 
inadequate funds for their other obligations, compelling them to take a new 
payday loan almost immediately.”). 
 44. See Martin, supra note 27, at 574 (describing methods used by lenders 
to encourage repeat borrowing). 
 45. See Allied Cash Advance Customer Loyalty Card (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 46. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CFA SURVEY OF ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN 
WEBSITES 5–6 (2011), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFAsurvey 
InternetPaydayLoanWebsites.pdf (discussing APR disclosures and state 
regulation of internet payday lenders); JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, INTERNET 
PAYDAY LENDING: HOW HIGH-PRICED LENDERS USE THE INTERNET TO MIRE 
BORROWERS IN DEBT AND EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTIONS 22 (2004), 
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/ 
finance/Internet_Payday_Lending113004.PDF (discussing the costs of internet 
payday loans). 
 47. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., supra note 46, at 5 (describing 
jurisdictional disclosures made by internet payday lenders). 
 48. See id. at 11–12 (describing the typical privacy policies of internet 
payday lending websites). 
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procedures make it extremely difficult to pay off the principal of the 
loans rather than just the two-week fee.49 Recently, the Minnesota 
Attorney General’s office sued five payday lenders for automatically 
renewing loans and providing no meaningful procedure for paying 
off loans in full.50  
D. The Legal and Regulatory Framework of Payday Lending 
As set out in this Article, internet payday lenders have a weak 
history of complying with state laws. A 2004 survey of online 
lenders demonstrates this point.51 Payday lenders are subject to 
state laws that range from draconian—payday lending is a RICO 
violation in Georgia—to permissive.52 The majority of states have 
laws that specifically authorize payday lending.53 In recent years, 
state regulators have brought enforcement actions against online 
lenders that fail to comply with state laws, with the West Virginia 
Attorney General’s office being among the most active.54 A 2011 
survey of twenty internet payday lenders noted that a growing 
number of websites post copies of their state licenses and claim to 
make loans only in states where they are licensed.55 The most recent 
survey by the Consumer Federation of America (CFA) notes that 
lenders continue to claim choice of law from lax jurisdictions, to 
                                                                                                     
 49. See id. at 8–9 (describing internet payday loan payment terms and how 
they result in a debt trap). 
 50. See Minnesota Sues Five Internet Payday Lenders, 
CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news 
04/2011/09/minnesota-sues-five-internet-payday-lenders.html (last visited Jan. 
7, 2011) (describing various consumer complaints about internet payday 
lenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 51. See FOX & PETRINI, supra note 46, at 7–12 (discussing the ways in 
which internet payday lenders evade state laws). 
 52. See Legal Status of Payday Lending by State, PAYDAY CONSUMER LOAN 
INFORMATION, http://www.paydayloaninfo.org/legal-status (last visited Jan. 11, 
2012) (summarizing state laws regarding payday lending) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See id. (noting that thirty-three states permit payday lending with safe 
harbor legislation). 
 54. See Press Release, Office of the W.Va. Att’y Gen. (Aug. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.wvago.gov/pdf/press/2011_onsumersfromDelaware 
InternetPaydayLender.pdf (announcing the recovery of $300,000 from a 
Delaware Internet lender for West Virginians). 
 55. FOX & PETRINI, supra note 46, at 5–6.  
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locate off-shore, or to claim tribal sovereign immunity to avoid 
complying with state consumer protections.56 
There currently is no federal law regulating the specific terms 
of these loans, although the Truth in Lending Act,57 the Electronic 
Fund Transfer Act,58 and other general federal laws apply to online 
lending. Moreover, many laws passed by states have been quickly 
skirted by lenders, unless the law includes an interest rate cap.59 
For example, in 2007, New Mexico passed a law that capped fees at 
$15 per $100 borrowed for a period of up to two weeks;60 required 
that lenders offer a free installment plan to any customer who could 
not pay back a loan;61 prohibited all rollovers;62 limited loans to 25% 
of a borrower’s gross income;63 and provided for a right of 
rescission,64 among other limitations.65 This new law also provided 
that all loans must go into a statewide database so these new 
provisions could be enforced.66 Similar laws have been passed in 
Florida, Oklahoma, Michigan, Illinois, North Dakota, and Indiana, 
                                                                                                     
 56. Id. at 4. 
 57. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601–1667f (2012). 
 58. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1693–1693r (2012).  
 59. See URIAH KING & LESLIE PARRISH, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, 
SPRINGING THE DEBT TRAP: RATE CAPS ARE ONLY PROVEN PAYDAY LENDING 
REFORM 12–18 (2007), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-
lending/research-analysis/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf (describing how various 
regulatory strategies have failed to stop the payday loan debt trap). 
 60. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-33(B) (West 2011). 
 61. Id. § 58-15-35(A). 
 62. Id. § 58-15-34(A). 
 63. Id. § 58-15-32(A). According to the Center for Responsible Lending, 
income limit requirements do not necessarily help consumers avoid becoming 
trapped in debt. KING & PARRISH, supra note 59, at 16. Because this income 
restriction was based on the consumer’s gross income and thus on a dollar figure 
that the consumer did not actually have available, it did not relate directly to 
the consumer’s ability to repay the loan. Additionally, the income figure was for 
an entire month but in most cases the term of the loan was for only two weeks, 
meaning that the consumer only had half of the stated income with which to 
attempt to repay the loan in any case. None of this makes any difference 
anyway, because once the law was passed, lenders stopped making loans 
covered by the new law and moved on to something else. 
 64. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-32(C) (West 2011). 
 65. See id. §§ 58-15-32 to 58-15-39 (enumerating all the requirements for 
payday lending added in 2007). 
 66. Id. § 58-15-37. 
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but lenders have quickly found ways to skirt the laws.67 Because a 
last-minute definition added to the bill made the new law apply only 
to loans of fourteen to thirty-five days in duration and those 
involving a post-dated check, the industry quickly began selling a 
product that fell outside the definition.68 In short, the new law 
accomplished very little.  The New Mexico law, like some others 
around the country, capped interest rates at a generous 417%, yet 
payday lenders still found reason to invent new products to skirt the 
law.69 
This is not to say that all states have been ineffective at 
regulating payday loans, as the recent CFA study shows.70 State 
interest rate caps have been very effective at eliminating payday 
loan abuses,71 but even this solution may have met its match—tribal 
sovereign immunity. Lenders make no secret about why they want 
to team up with Indian tribes, as this advertisement for an internet 
payday loan explains: 
Due to the strict regulations that are hitting the payday loan 
industry hard, many lenders are now turning to Indian Tribes to 
help them out. The American Indian Tribes throughout the 
United States have been granted sovereign immunity which 
means that they are not held subject to the laws that payday 
loans are currently going up against. There are 12 states which 
have banned payday lending but as long as their (sic) is an Indian 
tribe who runs the operation on this sovereign land, the lenders 
can continue their business even where payday loans have 
already been banned. Similar to the Casino boom, payday loans 
are the new financial strategy that many are using as a loophole 
through the strict payday loan laws. The revenue is quite high 
and promising for these tribes who often find themselves 
struggling. There are approximately 35 online cash advance and 
payday loan companies that are owned by American Indian 
                                                                                                     
 67. See Martin, supra note 27, at 588–93 (describing how other states have 
attempted and failed to successfully regulate and curb payday borrowing). 
 68. Id. at 585–86 (describing how lenders changed their product to fall 
outside the definition of a payday loan). 
 69. Id. at 585. 
 70. See NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., SMALL DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS 
SCORECARD—UPDATED 14–20 (2010), available at http://www.consumer 
fed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Updated_Scorecard.pdf (grading 
states based on whether they impose a 36% APR cap on small dollar loans). 
 71. See KING & PARRISH, supra note 59, at 19 (describing the success of 
interest rate caps and listing the savings achieved by states that enforce an 
interest rate cap). 
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tribes. Consumers have taken out approximately 12,500 loans 
over the last year in which these tribes made approximately $420 
million. It is no surprise that many lending companies are 
currently seeking out American Indian Tribes in an effort to save 
their businesses by escaping US lending laws. Tribal leaders are 
paid a few thousand dollars a month for allowing a payday lender 
to incorporate on tribal land. The more lenders that tribes allow 
to move onto their reservation, the larger the profit that they 
make.72 
This quote also explains that under this version of the tribal 
affiliation model, tribes get the crumbs while the non-tribal 
outsiders use their tribal sovereignty to make huge profits. 
Moreover, as this advertisement makes clear, lenders using the 
model described in the advertisement are by no means tribes 
themselves. The next part of this Article analyzes whether these 
practices entitle some payday lenders to tribal sovereign immunity, 
and if so, which ones. 
IV. Background on Sovereignty and Sovereign Immunity 
A. Sovereignty Versus Sovereign Immunity 
“There is nothing more important to Indian governments and 
Indian people than sovereignty.”73 Tribal sovereignty is embodied in 
hundreds of treaties between Indian nations and the colonial 
powers,74 referenced in the U.S. Constitution, recognized by a vast 
                                                                                                     
 72. The Connection Between Indian Tribes and Payday Lending, ONLINE 
CASH ADVANCE, http://www.online-cash-advance.com/financial-news/the-connection-
between-indian-tribes-and-payday-lending#ixzz1Nt1vQu6h (last visited Jan. 11, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 73. Framework of Tribal Sovereignty, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY CENTER, 
http://www.americanindianpolicycenter.org/projects/marge1.html (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 74. See FELIX S. COHEN, COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW  204–
24 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., Lexis Nexis 2005) (1941) (tracing the history 
and extent of powers tribal powers and tribal sovereignty). When two 
governments enter into a treaty with one another, they are recognizing each 
other as sovereigns. For example, states generally enter into contracts with each 
other that are called compacts. Treaties are the basis of the relationship 
between tribes and the United States. Id. When the United States government 
recognized tribes as sovereigns through treaties, they were following in the 
footsteps of European nations that had done the same thing. Id. at 208. 
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body of Supreme Court jurisprudence, and affirmed by numerous 
laws.75 It is also referenced in the “Indians not taxed” provision of 
the Constitution.76 The concept is so fundamental that it runs 
through most legal scholarship on the subject of Indian law.77 Tribal 
sovereignty predates both federal and state governments.78 Indian 
governments have inherent sovereignty which is not derived from 
any other government but rather from the people themselves.79  
Despite this clear recognition of tribal sovereignty, Congress 
and the Supreme Court have been chipping away at this principle 
little by little, by limiting the regulatory power of tribes and the 
jurisdiction of tribal courts. 80  In so doing, Congress and the 
Supreme Court have systematically stripped tribes of the power to 
control events taking place on their lands and taken away 
affirmative governance powers.81 At the same time, the Supreme 
Court has expanded tribal immunity, or protection from suit.82 
According to one scholar, this combination of removal of governance 
powers from tribes and concurrent expansion of immunity could 
lead to a lack of government accountability, increased uncertainty 
about the law, and increased animosity toward tribes among the 
                                                                                                     
 75. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal) Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
799, 821–22 (2007).  
 76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (“Representatives shall be apportioned 
among the several states according to their respective numbers . . . excluding 
Indians not taxed.”). 
 77. There are three types of sovereigns in the United States, the federal 
government, state governments, which derive their sovereignty from the federal 
government, and Indian governments. 
 78. COHEN, supra note 74, at 204. 
 79. See id. at 205 (noting that tribes are distinct entities with powers of 
self-government derived from original sovereignty rather than a delegation of 
powers). To have any sovereign nation, you need a distinct, unique group of 
people, who have a distinct language, a distinct moral and religious structure, 
and a distinct cultural base. They must have a specific geographic area that 
they control and regulate. Within that area, they must possess governmental 
powers, including the power to tax and the power to change their government if 
they see fit. These governmental powers must be acknowledged by the people 
who are subject to them, and they must be enforceable by some sort of authority, 
whether it be military, police, or general citizen control. 
 80. Katherine J. Florey, Indian Country’s Borders: Territoriality, 
Immunity, and the Construction of Tribal Sovereignty, 51 B.C. L. REV. 595, 597–
98 (2010) (discussing the erosion of tribal sovereignty). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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general population.83 Thus, while the following discussion describes 
a broad expansion of tribal sovereign immunity, this expansion 
takes place in the context of constriction of tribal sovereignty in 
general. 
B. Tribal Sovereign Immunity 
Generally speaking, the immunity of a sovereign to suit is a 
longstanding corollary to the sovereignty of any governmental 
entity.84 Tribal sovereign immunity derives from tribal 
sovereignty.85 Like state and federal sovereign immunity, tribal 
immunity is an inherent power that prohibits state and private 
suits against tribes, except in certain circumstances.86 Because 
tribes are governments, it has long been understood that federally 
recognized Indian tribes are subject to suit only when Congress 
authorizes the suit or the tribe has waived its immunity.87 Tribal 
sovereign immunity was once thought to be confined to 
governmental on-reservation activity and thus did not extend to off-
reservation conduct.88 However, after the Kiowa89 decision described 
below, a federal common-law default rule of immunity for all tribal 
                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 595. 
 84. See id. at 616–17 (discussing the origins of the sovereign immunity 
doctrine).  
 85. COHEN, supra note 74, at 635. 
 86. Id. at 636. Tribal sovereign immunity does not bar suits by the federal 
government, however. Id. 
 87. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
 88. See id. at 754–56 (noting that while the Court never drew a distinction, 
other courts had limited off-reservation immunity). 
 89. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998) 
(permitting tribal sovereign immunity to extend off-reservation). Kiowa involved 
a Tribal Development Commission that agreed to purchase stock through a 
promissory note in the name of the tribe. Id. at 751. Though the tribe argued the 
deal was signed on tribal land, the Respondent maintained that the note was 
executed and delivered in Oklahoma City, or non-tribal land. Id. The tribe 
defaulted on the note and the Respondent sued for the breach of contract. Id. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that Indian tribes are subject to suit in 
state court for breaches of contract involving off-reservation commercial 
conduct. Id. at 755. The United States Supreme Court reversed. Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court declined to draw a distinction based on where the tribal activity 
occurred, granting sovereignty to tribal conduct for purely off-reservation 
conduct. Id. at 760. 
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activity, on- or off-reservation, was articulated by the U.S. Supreme 
Court.90 By declining to draw a distinction between tribal activities 
on or off reservation land, and choosing to defer to Congress, the 
Court held that tribal sovereign immunity applies to virtually all 
tribally-owned enterprises, whatever the industry and wherever 
located.91 Thus, states may attempt to regulate off-reservation tribal 
activities, but sovereign immunity prevents states from enforcing its 
substantive laws against tribes through the courts.92 
C. The History of Indian Sovereign Immunity: Does It Rest on 
a “Slender Reed”? 
Tribal immunity rests on a far more slender reed than 
sovereignty itself. Tribes have had sovereignty over their members, 
territory, and affairs from “time immemorial.”93 Congress has 
limited this sovereignty, however, by placing tribes under the 
legislative authority of the United States.94 Tribal sovereignty, then, 
is subject to the will of Congress, which exercises plenary power 
over Indian affairs.95  
D. Pre-Kiowa Case Law 
Although tribal sovereign immunity is now well established, the 
U.S. Supreme Court claims that the doctrine developed “almost by 
                                                                                                     
 90. See id. at 764 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[W]e have treated the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity from judicial jurisdiction as settled law, but in none of 
our cases have we applied the doctrine to purely off-reservation conduct.”). 
 91. See id. at 760 (majority opinion) (“[W]e decline to revisit our case law 
and choose to defer to Congress. Tribes enjoy immunity from suits on contracts, 
whether those contracts involve governmental or commercial activities and 
whether they were made on or off a reservation.”). 
 92. See id. at 755 (“There is a difference between the right to demand 
compliance with state laws and the means available to enforce them.”). 
 93. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 3 (1831). 
 94. See COHEN, supra note 74, at 221–24 (discussing federal statutory 
limitations on tribal sovereignty). 
 95. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896) (“[A]lthough possessed of 
these attributes of local self-government when exercising their tribal functions, 
all such rights are subject to the supreme legislative authority of the United 
States.”). 
PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES 771 
accident.”96 The Court never mentioned the sovereign immunity of a 
tribe until the 1919 case of Turner v. United States,97 in which it 
mentioned the doctrine in dicta.98 Turner arose when members of 
the Creek Tribe tore down a fence to Creek grazing lands leased to 
Turner, and Turner sued the tribe for not preventing the 
destruction.99 In Turner, the Court held that the obstacle to recovery 
was “not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a 
substantive right.”100 The case was decided not on the basis of the 
sovereign immunity of the Creek Nation, but rather because the 
failure of a government or its officers to keep the peace was not 
actionable.101 Justice Kennedy, writing almost eighty years later, 
called the Turner tribal sovereignty language a “slender reed” for 
supporting today’s principle of tribal sovereign immunity.102  
The hint articulated in Turner became recognized law twenty-
one years later in United States v. United States Fidelity and 
Guaranty Co. (U.S. F. & G.).103 In U.S. F. & G., the Court ruled on a 
cross-claim filed for mining royalties against two tribal nations.104 
Citing Turner, the Court held that tribes are “exempt from suit 
without Congressional authorization,” that the immunity of the 
tribes was inherently “theirs as sovereigns,” and that immunity for 
tribes rested on the same public policy as federal sovereign 
immunity.105 U.S. F. & G. stands for a generalized notion of tribal 
sovereign immunity, retained since the pre-European era. 
Since Turner in 1940, the concept of tribal sovereign immunity 
has taken much fuller form. In fact, since the Santa Clara Pueblo106 
decision in 1978, it has been clear that without an explicit 
                                                                                                     
 96. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 761 (1998). 
 97. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354 (1919). 
 98. Florey, supra note 80, at 619. 
 99. Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 356–57 (1919). Turner also sued 
the United States as trustee of Creek funds. Id. at 357. 
 100. Id. at 358. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998). 
 103. See United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940) 
(“These Indian Nations are exempt from suit without Congressional 
authorization.”). 
 104. Id. at 510. 
 105. Id. at 512–13. The Court did not articulate the common public policy. 
 106. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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Congressional waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, a tribal 
government can choose not to follow even federal law—at least 
where the plaintiff is an individual citizen rather than the federal 
government itself.107 In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the 
Supreme Court interpreted the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA), a 
federal statute that extends portions of the Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment to tribal people and lands.108 The Santa 
Clara Pueblo had a policy of excluding from membership the 
children of females who married outside the tribe, but including the 
children of males, which potentially violated ICRA.109 However, in 
the absence of “unequivocally expressed” Congressional intent that 
a tribe is subject to a suit in federal court, the Court found that 
sovereign immunity barred a suit against the tribe under ICRA.110 
Thus, although the law was constructed by Congress to apply to 
tribes, sovereign immunity was held to be sufficiently robust to 
prevent federal enforcement of IRCA, at least when the suit was 
brought by an individual plaintiff.111  
In Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi 
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma,112 the Supreme Court held that 
sovereign immunity extends to on-reservation commercial activity 
conducted by a tribe.113 In Potawatomi, Oklahoma sought the 
collection of the state tax on cigarettes by the Potawatomi tribal 
convenience store.114 Although the Court held that the state of 
Oklahoma had the authority to tax cigarette sales to non-tribal 
members, it could not sue the tribe to collect the revenue.115 The 
Court suggested alternative remedies, including collecting the sales 
tax from wholesalers by off-reservation seizure of cigarettes or 
                                                                                                     
 107. See id. at 55–58 (discussing tribal sovereign immunity).  
 108. Id. at 62–72. 
 109. Id. at 51.  
 110. Id. at 58–59. 
 111. Id. at 71–72. Santa Clara was upsetting to some scholars and caused 
consternation toward the Supreme Court at the time. At its essence, however, 
the decision could hardly have gone any other way. Only a tribe, and certainly 
not the federal government, can decide who in society is entitled to tribal 
membership.  
 112. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 
498 U.S. 505 (1991). 
 113. Id. at 513. 
 114. Id. at 507–08. 
 115. Id. at 512. 
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assessing suppliers, by agreement with the tribe, or through 
lobbying Congress.116 In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens noted 
that he was unsure that tribal sovereign immunity would extend to 
the off-reservation commercial activity of a tribe.117 Five years later, 
in Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Court held 
exactly that. 
E. The Kiowa Holding 
In Kiowa Tribe v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc., the Court 
held that tribal sovereign immunity applies to off-reservation 
commercial activity conducted by a tribe.118 In Kiowa, the tribe 
defaulted on a note executed off-reservation to Manufacturing 
Technologies, who sued the tribe for the balance owed.119 The Court 
agreed with Manufacturing Technologies’ argument that state laws 
can be applied to tribal activities outside of Indian country.120 But, 
citing Potawatomi, the Court countered that “[t]here is a difference 
between the right to demand compliance with state laws and the 
means available to enforce them.”121 The Court refused to limit 
tribal sovereign immunity to suits stemming from on-reservation 
transactions, noting that precedent did not support a distinction 
based on reservation boundaries.122 Nor was the Court willing to 
draw a distinction between commercial and governmental activities 
of a tribe.123 Rather, the Court held that an “Indian tribe is subject 
to suit only where Congress has expressly authorized the suit or the 
tribe has waived immunity,”124 and that tribal sovereign immunity 
“is a matter of federal law and is not subject to diminution by the 
States.”125  
                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 514. 
 117. Id. at 515 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 118. Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). 
 119. Id. at 751. 
 120. Id. at 755.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 754–55.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 754. 
 125. Id. at 756. 
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The Court in Kiowa articulated a clear and robust doctrine of 
tribal sovereign immunity but showed some reluctance to do so, 
stating that there were reasons “to doubt the wisdom of 
perpetuating the doctrine.”126 Given the interdependent and mobile 
American society of the late twentieth century, and the broad 
participation of tribes in the wider economy, noted the Court, tribal 
sovereign immunity “can harm those who are unaware that they are 
dealing with a tribe who do not know of tribal immunity or who 
have no choice in the matter, as in the case of tort victims.”127 The 
Court stated that the rationale for a broad tribal immunity—the 
safeguarding of tribal self-governance and promotion of economic 
development and self-sufficiency—could be “challenged as 
inapposite to modern, wide-ranging tribal enterprises extending 
well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities.”128 Although 
tribal sovereign immunity was a judicially created doctrine, and 
despite the Court’s reservations about the doctrine’s reach, the 
Court in Kiowa candidly chose to defer to Congress.129 In so doing, 
the Court invited Congress to reconsider the wisdom of recognizing 
sovereign immunity.130 
F. Kiowa’s Progeny 
Nearly one-hundred years since the first passing mention of 
tribal sovereign immunity, it is clear from Kiowa that any tribal 
enterprise not subject to a specific waiver of immunity by Congress 
or the tribe is immune from suit on the basis of tribal sovereign 
immunity.131 Kiowa’s progeny is extensive.132 One 2008 study of 
                                                                                                     
 126. Id. at 758. Note the Court’s retention of the doctrine in Potawatomi “on 
the theory that Congress had failed to abrogate it in order to promote economic 
development and tribal self-sufficiency.” Id. at 757.  
 127. Id. at 758. 
 128. Id. at 757–58. 
 129. Id. at 758–60. The Court noted that Congress was “in a position to 
weigh and accommodate the competing policy concerns and reliance interests,” 
and that Congress has authorized suit against tribes in the past, but had not 
done so in this area. Id. at 759. 
 130. Id. at 758. 
 131. Id. at 760. 
 132. See Jeff M. Kosseff, Note, Sovereignty for Profits: Courts’ Expansion of 
Sovereign Immunity to Tribe-Owned Businesses, 5 FLA. A & M U. L. REV. 131, 
138–39 (2009) (discussing the multitude of lower court cases that have followed 
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Kiowa’s effects on reported decisions found seventy-one opinions 
citing Kiowa as a primary reason to extend sovereign immunity to a 
tribally-owned commercial entity.133 Forty-six of these were casino-
related cases, seventeen involved breach of contract claims filed by 
companies that did business with a tribe, twenty-six involved 
employment-related suits, and twenty-one were personal injury 
claims.134 Thirty-nine of the seventy-one opinions were federal and 
twenty-one were state court opinions.135  
V. Confused Courts: Is the Arm of the Tribe a Misplaced 
Appendage? 
Now that tribal sovereignty extends to commercial enterprises 
and off-reservation conduct, the question becomes, What constitutes 
a tribal enterprise? If anything remotely connected to a tribe will 
qualify, Congress may well move to abrogate immunity in the face of 
a power that can be easily abused. This seems particularly likely in 
cases where the entities gaining the financial benefits from 
immunity are not tribes, but outside, non-tribal interests for whom 
there may be no policy justification for immunity. Since Kiowa, the 
Supreme Court has yet to address what constitutes a tribal 
enterprise directly, though it did recognize in a footnote that a 
corporation can be an “arm of the tribe” for sovereign immunity 
purposes.136 Using this passing phrase as a starting point, courts 
now attempt to determine if a corporate entity is an arm of the tribe 
through various multi-factor tests.137 
                                                                                                     
Kiowa). 
 133. Id. at 138. 
 134. See id. (“Immunity [has been provided] to a wide variety of tribal 
entities, including tobacco companies, snow removal contractors, truck stops, 
hotels, and payday loan companies.”). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the 
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 705 n.1 (2003).  
 137. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046–47 (9th Cir. 
2006) (examining whether a casino was operated as an “arm of the tribe”). For 
earlier uses of the test, see Redding Rancheria v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
773, 776–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that factors to determine if an entity is 
entitled to immunity include the importance of gaming in promoting tribal self-
determination, the close link between the tribe and the casino, and the existence 
of federal law promoting Indian gambling). As established in Kiowa, the 
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A. Arm of the Tribe Outside Payday Lending 
Courts have articulated numerous variations on the test for 
whether a tribal business enterprise is entitled to the tribe’s 
immunity. Common factors used by courts in the arm-of-the-tribe 
analysis include:  
(1) whether the enterprise performs a commercial (i.e., 
proprietary) or traditional governmental function; (2) whether it 
is for-profit or nonprofit and generates its own revenue; (3) the 
enterprise’s financial relationship with the tribe, including where 
the enterprise’s revenues go and how they are used; (4) whether a 
suit against the enterprise will jeopardize tribal assets; 
(5) whether the enterprise has insurance to protect the tribal 
fiscal resources; and (6) who controls the enterprise’s activities.138 
Immunity clearly extends to tribally-owned health 
organizations, housing authorities, museums, and casinos.139 As the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Allen v. Gold Casino, the 
casino’s creation in that case was “dependent upon government 
approval at numerous levels, in order for it to conduct gaming 
activities permitted only under the auspices of the Tribe.”140 
However, casinos are somewhat unique in the world of tribal 
economic development, as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
explicitly provides for the creation and operation of Indian casinos, 
in order to promote “tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, 
and strong tribal governments.”141 While the U.S. Supreme Court 
has set out the name of the relevant test, i.e., the arm-of-the-tribe 
standard, it is still unclear what constitutes an arm of the tribe. 
                                                                                                     
question is not whether the activity may be characterized as a business, which 
is irrelevant, but whether the entity acts as an arm of the tribe so that its 
activities are properly deemed to be those of the tribe. Gold Country Casino, 464 
F.3d at 1046. 
 138. Patrice H. Kunesh, Tribal Self-Determination in the Age of Scarcity, 54 
S.D. L. REV. 398, 399 (2009) (citations omitted). 
 139. Id. at 402. For a collection of cases and their conclusions regarding 
various entities, see id. at 402–03 nn.29, 31. 
 140. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d at 1046. 
 141. Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1)).  
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B. The Application of Kiowa to Payday Lending: “[W]e are in a 
Gray Zone.”142 
It is presumptively true from Kiowa’s holding that an internet-
based payday lender that is formed, funded, and run by a tribe for 
the benefit of the tribe is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity.143 If 
that scenario exists at all, however, it is rare. Typically, a non-tribal 
payday lender makes an arrangement with a tribe under which the 
tribe receives a percentage of the profits, or simply a monthly fee, so 
that otherwise forbidden practices of the lender are presumably 
shielded by tribal immunity.144 This is described in the payday 
lending industry as the “sovereign model.”145 Although there is little 
sunlight on the true financial arrangements between the tribes and 
payday lenders, under one such agreement, between one and two 
percent of the payday profits of one “tribal” lender actually went to 
the tribes.146 By contrast, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,147 
which extensively regulates the Indian gaming industry for the 
benefit of tribes, mandates that at least 60% of the profits from each 
gaming enterprise go directly go to the tribe under normal 
circumstances,148 with a maximum of 30% going to non-tribal 
consultants and mangers.149  
                                                                                                     
 142. Petition for Review and Stay at 17, MTE Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Alameda 
County Super. Ct., No. S194110 (Cal. June 20, 2011), 2011 WL 2707079, at *17 
(quoting the trial judge from trial transcript). 
 143. See supra notes 118–30 and accompanying text (discussing the holding 
of Kiowa). 
 144. See The Connection Between Indian Tribes and Payday Lending, supra 
note 72 (briefly describing the partnership between tribes and payday lenders). 
 145. See C4T, Huge Victory for the Sovereign Model, Feb. 12, 2012, 
http://www.consultants4tribes.com/category/sovereign-model (last visited Mar. 
2, 2012) (collecting this and other blog posts related to the sovereign model) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); PAYDAY LOAN INDUSTRY BLOG, 
http://paydayloanindustryblog.com/Payday%20loan%20industry/sovereign-nation-
model/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2012) (collecting blog posts related to the sovereign 
model) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 146. Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s 
Petition for Review and Request for Stay at 4, No. S194110 (Cal. June 23, 2011), 
2011 WL 2907024, at *4 (“Verified discovery responses in this case supplied by 
another defendant, Processing Solutions, LLC, states that MTE received 
between 1% and 2% of the total loan revenue.”).  
 147. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701–2721 (2012). 
 148. Id. § 2710(b)(4).  
 149. Id. § 2711(7). 
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As the last section articulates, in the absence of guidance from 
Congress or binding precedent,150 state and federal courts are 
developing arm-of-the-tribe tests piecemeal.151 For example, a recent 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case also sets out a multi-factor 
test.152 This inconsistency and lack of authority has led to expensive, 
inefficient litigation. Although it is unclear whether and under what 
circumstances the typical tribally-affiliated payday lender will meet 
these tests, tribes and their affiliated lenders have yet to experience 
a significant setback at trial. Below we examine three recent cases 
from state courts. As would be expected after the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Kiowa, policy arguments resting on the harm done to a 
vulnerable population by tribally-affiliated payday lenders whose 
practices violate state regulations have not succeeded in court. In 
Ameriloan v. Superior Court,153 the court acknowledged but then 
rejected the California Department of Corporations’ equitable 
arguments against applying sovereign immunity in the context of 
payday lending.154 There, the California Court of Appeals held that 
sovereign immunity is not a discretionary doctrine.155 It is 
independent of the equities of a given situation.156 Rather, this is a 
“pure jurisdictional question.”157  
The court stated, however, that it was within the realm of the 
imagination that a tribal entity could engage in activities that were 
                                                                                                     
 150. Kiowa clarified that sovereign immunity applies to off-reservation 
tribal commercial enterprises, but involved a suit against the tribe itself, and 
did not outline a test to determine when a tribally created entity qualifies as an 
arm of the tribe. 
 151. See supra Part V.A. 
 152. Breakthrough Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 
629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010). In this case, the Court applied a test that 
included these factors for determining whether a tribal economic entity qualifies 
as “subordinate to the tribe,” so as to share in the tribe’s sovereign immunity: 
(1) the method of creation of the entity; (2) its purpose; (3) its structure, 
ownership, and management, including the amount of control the tribe exercises 
over the entity; (4) the tribe’s intent with respect to the sharing of the soverign 
immunity; (5) the financial relationship between the tribe and the entity; and 
(6) whether the purposes of tribal sovereign immunity are served by granting 
the entity immunity. Id. 
 153. Ameriloan v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). 
 154. Id. at 581–82.  
 155. Id. at 582.  
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  
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so distant from tribal interests that the entity could no longer be 
legitimately seen as an extension of the tribe and would therefore 
fail the arm-of-the-tribe test and not be entitled to immunity.158 
Tribally chartered corporations that are “completely independent of 
the tribe,” noted the court, are not covered by the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity.159 Ameriloan also left open the possibility that 
a distinction in sovereign immunity might be drawn between Indian 
gaming entities and payday loan companies, on the basis that the 
Indian gaming industry has been recognized by Congress as 
important to the welfare of Indian tribes, while payday lending has 
not.160 
Rather than rule against the lender, the court in Ameriloan 
remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether 
payday lending entities are sufficiently related to the tribe to benefit 
from sovereign immunity.161 In order to analyze whether payday 
lending entities are in fact arms of the tribe, the Ameriloan court 
instructed the lower court to consider two factors: (1) “whether the 
tribe and the entities are closely linked in governing structure and 
characteristics” and (2) “whether federal policies intended to 
promote Indian tribal autonomy are furthered by extension of 
immunity to the business entity.”162 The Ameriloan court authorized 
limited discovery, “directed solely to matters affecting the trial 
court’s subject matter jurisdiction,”163 meaning discovery tailored to 
the two broad factors mentioned above. 
Cash Advance and Preferred Cash Loans v. State,164 a Colorado 
Supreme Court case, upheld the Colorado Court of Appeals decision 
that sovereign immunity from suit shielded two tribally affiliated 
internet payday lenders when they operated as arms of the tribe, 
                                                                                                     
 158. Id. at 585 (quoting Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
2d. 65, 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 159.  Id. (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Super. Ct., 52 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 659, 665 (Cal. 2006)). 
 160. Id. at 586 n.10. 
 161. Id. at 585. 
 162. Id. at 586 (citing Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 
(9th Cir. 2006); Redding Rancheria v. Super. Ct., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 773, 776 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 65, 
68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)). 
 163. Id. 
 164. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 P.3d 1099 (Colo. 
2010) (en banc). 
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but it significantly altered the lower court’s arm-of-the-tribe test.165 
The lenders, affiliated with the Miami Nation and the Santee Sioux 
Nation, were targeted by the Colorado Attorney General for 
allegedly violating the state’s payday lending laws.166 The Court of 
Appeals reviewed five different arm-of-the-tribe tests from other 
jurisdictions,167 focusing on an eleven-factor test culled from the 
dissent of a Washington Supreme Court case.168 The Colorado 
Supreme Court, citing Kiowa, rejected the eleven-factor test, stating 
that at least two of the factors considered “the entity’s purpose [and] 
would function as a state-imposed limitation on tribal sovereign 
immunity, in contravention of [Kiowa].”169 
The Colorado Supreme Court replaced the eleven-part test with 
a three-factor test that “focuses on the relationship between the 
tribal entities and the tribes: . . . (1) whether the tribes created the 
entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes own and 
operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects 
the tribes’ sovereignty.”170 Contrary to the Court of Appeals, which 
factored in the purpose of the entity, the Colorado Supreme Court 
explicitly grounded its approach in the inherent nature of tribal 
sovereignty.171 Cash Advance also clarified that the burden of proof 
rests not with the tribe, but rather with the state, which must prove 
that sovereign immunity does not apply.172 
                                                                                                     
 165. See id. at 1110 (adopting three factors from the federal courts of appeal 
and noting that the Colorado Court of Appeal’s eleven factor test was “contrary 
to federal in some respects”). 
 166. Id. at 1103. 
 167. State ex rel. Suthers v. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 205 
P.3d 389, 403–05 (Colo. App. 2008). 
 168. Id. at 405–06. The Washington Supreme Court case from which the 
eleven-factor test was taken by the lower court is Wright v. Colville Tribal 
Enterprise Corp., 147 P.3d 1275 (Wash. 2006). 
 169. Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans, 242 P.3d at 1111. The two 
factors that were explicitly rejected were: “(2) whether the purposes of Cash 
Advance and Preferred Cash are similar to the Tribes’ purposes;” and “(9) the 
announced purposes of Cash Advance and Preferred Cash.” Id. at1105. Another 
notable factor that was jettisoned was “(10) whether Cash Advance and 
Preferred Cash manage or exploit tribal resources.” Id. 
 170. Id. at 1110. 
 171. See id. at 1110 n.11. (“We prefer an approach that recognizes, without 
diminishing, the inherent nature of tribal sovereignty.”). 
 172. Id. at 1113. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed that sovereign 
immunity is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction rather than an affirmative 
defense, and thus that, as a result, the state must prove by a preponderance of 
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The Colorado Supreme Court remanded to the state trial court, 
which held that the lending entities were, in fact, arms of the tribe 
and thus entitled to sovereign immunity.173 The court noted that a 
tribal entity does not lose its immunity simply by contracting with 
non-Indian operators of the business.174 It found that the 
Congressional intent of promoting tribal economic development was 
furthered by allowing Indian Nations the freedom “to enter into 
commercial areas where they have no expertise, but can acquire the 
necessary expertise through non-Indian operators.”175 
The court held that the inquiry into tribal immunity is focused 
on the status of the entities in the present.176 In other words, 
whether a particular entity meets the arm-of-the-tribe test is 
answered with the facts as they are when the court considers the 
matter, not when the complaint was filed or any other time in the 
past.177 
The court found that the three factors of the arm-of-the-tribe 
test were met with regard to the two tribal entities at issue. It found 
that the entities in question, Miami Nations Enterprises, Inc. 
(MNE) and SFS, Inc. (SFS)178 were formed pursuant to tribal law as 
evidenced by documents put before the court.179 The court further 
held that the businesses were owned and operated by the tribes,180 
and were thus in such relation to the tribe that granting immunity 
would protect the sovereignty of the tribe.181 
                                                                                                     
evidence that the tribes are not entitled to sovereign immunity. Id. 
 173. Amended Order, State of Colorado v. Cash Advance, Case No. 
05CV1143, on remand, Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. State, 242 
P.3d 1099 (Colo. 2010) (en banc) (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 174. Id. at 11. 
 175. Id. (citing Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. Riverside Cnty., 783 
F.2d 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1986), aff’d sub. nom. California v. Cabazon Band of 
Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (noting with approval that the tribal 
business was “operated by non-Indian professional operators, who receive a 
percentage of the profits”). 
 176. Id. at 12. The court uses the phrase “trapped in the present.” Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Doing business as, respectively, “Cash Advance” and “Preferred Cash 
Loans.” Id. at 5. 
 179. Id. at 13–14. 
 180. Id. at 15. Documents placed before the court indicated that the tribe 
chooses MNE’s board of directors, that two of the three directors must be 
members, and that the Business Committee hired the CEO. Id.  
 181. Id at 16. Here, the court points to economic benefits to the tribe from 
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The court looked in detail at Colorado’s assertion that the tribal 
entities were shams.182 It accepted the following as proven: that the 
payday loan businesses existed before the tribal entities took them 
over; that Scott Tucker, an experienced outside payday lender, 
owned and operated those prior businesses; that Tucker’s loan 
entities formerly did business under the current names of the 
entities; that the tribes were likely recruited in the mistaken belief 
that the businesses could be shielded by the sovereign immunity of 
the tribes; and that during the initial period of affiliation, Tucker 
was the true owner of the business.183 Nevertheless, because both 
tribes replaced Tucker’s entities with wholly-owned tribal 
corporations in 2008, the tribes were found to be the true owners at 
the time of the court’s consideration, and thus immune.184  
In dicta, the court speculated that even if it were true that 
Tucker “functionally” owned the business in the present, it is still 
“not at all certain the tribal entities would thereby lose their 
immunity.”185 It is the tribal entity that is immune, “not their 
particular businesses, and . . . tribal immunity does not depend in 
any fashion on the type of business a tribal entity engages in, with 
whom, or for what ulterior purpose.”186 However, the court noted 
that it is only the tribal entities and their officers while acting 
within the scope of tribal business that are immune from suit.187 
Thus, Colorado could subpoena Tucker and his non-tribal officers as 
well as non-tribal entities to discover whether they were and still 
are the lenders.188 The court found that the state could not subpoena 
                                                                                                     
the businesses. 
 182. Id. at 18–23. 
 183. Id. at 20–21 (noting that ownership could be inferred from the fact that 
Mr. Tucker put up all of the capital for the businesses, providing $3 million to 
one entity and $5 million to another). Both agreements called for 1% of the gross 
to go to the tribes, with a monthly minimum of $20,000. It should be noted that 
Judge Hoffman originally issued an order based on a misunderstanding that the 
tribes received 99% of the profits from Tucker. Judge Hoffman acknowledged 
the error in his amended order. He noted that the State’s sham argument was 
“closer as a factual matter” under the actual arrangements, but remained 
unproven. Further, the court said that “even if they were [sham owners,] that 
characterization would not displace tribal immunity.” Id. at 1–2 n.1.  
 184. Id. at 21.  
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. 
 187. Id at 22. 
 188. Id.  
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the tribal entities. Colorado cannot do that, said the court, “any 
more than it could subpoena France if it thought Tucker was the 
real owner and operator of Air France.”189 
Moreover, when the burden of proof rests on the party 
challenging the immunity of a tribally-affiliated payday lender, the 
specific details of what constitutes allowable discovery become 
extraordinarily important. In Specially Appearing Defendant MTE 
Financial Services, Inc. v. Alameda County Superior Court, briefed 
in June 2011, tribally-affiliated lender MTE challenged the scope of 
discovery allowed by the trial court.190 MTE and payday loan 
borrowers Baillie and Rosas (Baillie) agreed that discovery was 
appropriate on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction191 but 
disagreed on what such discovery would entail.192 More precisely, 
they disagreed about whether discovery should allow Baillie to 
“follow the money trail.”193 Baillie asserted that a “thorough 
explanation” of all the entities involved in the operation of the 
payday entities, and the relationships between these entities, is 
critical to the arm-of-the-tribe inquiry.194 To Baillie, the fact that the 
tribe might receive just 1% to 2% of the monies generated by the 
business implied that the tribe was merely rented.195 If so, argued 
Baillie, the lending entity could not possibly meet the arm-of-the-
tribe test.196  
Conversely, the lenders argued that allowing Baillie to “follow 
the money” would constitute unjustifiable intrusive discovery and 
                                                                                                     
 189. Id. 
 190. See Petition for Review and Stay at 5, MTE Fin. Servs., Inc., v. Super. 
Ct., No. S194110 (Cal. June 20, 2011), 2011 WL 2707079, at *5 (seeking review 
“to settle an important question related to whether Indian tribal sovereign 
immunity is dependent upon the type of ‘tribal business venture’”). 
 191. Ameriloan is binding precedent on this point. See supra notes 154–64 
and accompanying text (discussing the Ameriloan holding).  
 192. See Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s 
Petition for Review and Request for Stay,  supra note 146, at *3–4. 
 193. Compare id. at *4 (arguing that arm-of-the-tribe analysis necessitates 
an investigation of the money trail in this case), with Petition for Review and 
Stay, supra note 190, at 18 (arguing against the trial court’s order allowing 
Plaintiffs to “follow the money”). 
 194. Real Parties in Interest’s Answer to MTE Financial Services, Inc.’s 
Petition for Review and Request for Stay, supra note 192, at *4. 
 195. Id. at *12. 
 196. Id. at *12–13. 
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would pry into the internal affairs of the tribe.197 The tribe willingly 
provided MTE’s organizational documents and documents 
indicating that MTE is a chartered corporation organized under the 
laws of the Modoc Tribe of Oklahoma by Tribal Resolution, wholly 
owned by the Modoc Tribe, to facilitate goals relating to the 
economy, government, and sovereignty of the tribe.198 The articles of 
incorporation expressly provide for MTE to share in the sovereign 
immunity of the tribe.199 
The briefs in MTE illustrate the two poles of the arm-of-the-
tribe debate as it relates to tribally-affiliated lenders. Tribes will 
likely maintain that whether an entity functions as an arm of the 
tribe is a foundational inquiry, and not to be inferred from the 
functional arrangements, whatever they are. If tribal sovereignty is 
inherent and not subject to diminution by the states, so the 
argument goes, a state court lacks the power to hold that a tribal 
entity formed according to tribal law, by tribal resolution, for the 
stated purposes of tribal development, with clear intent on the part 
of the sovereign tribe to convey its sovereign immunity to the entity, 
is not an arm of the tribe, simply because the deal the tribe 
negotiated does not retain enough of the profits to satisfy the court. 
On the other hand, it is common sense that if an entity provides a 
miniscule percentage of its revenue to the tribe, and the tribe is 
barely involved, the entity cannot be said to stand in the place of the 
tribe. Moreover, if a tribe retains only a minimal percentage of the 
profits from the enterprise, it would appear that the enterprise may 
not be truly “controlled” by the tribe.  
C. If Today’s Lenders Are Not Tribes, What About Tomorrow’s? 
We suspect that many of the current connections between tribes 
and internet payday lenders are tenuous, and further, that tribes 
generally receive minimal compensation relative to their non-tribal 
partners. It is unclear whether these payday lending operations are 
managed by tribes in any substantial sense. In some cases we know 
that lenders claim to be tribally-owned when in reality, there is no 
                                                                                                     
 197. Petition for Review and Stay, supra note 190, at *18. 
 198. Id. at *4–5. 
 199. Id. at *9.  
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connection to a tribe.200 Obviously, tribal sovereign immunity is not 
implicated at all in such cases. Moreover, the most recent arm-of-
the-tribe test from a payday case201—a permissive formulation 
relative to past tests—requires that the enterprise be owned and 
operated by the tribe. Thus, any payday lending entity that entails 
strictly passive involvement on the part of the tribe would fail this 
test.  
It is less clear how future internet payday lenders will be 
operated, as tribes may themselves begin to operate these lenders 
and thus fulfill the arm-of-the-tribe test. Ironically, the more tightly 
states regulate the payday industry, the more valuable tribal 
sovereign immunity becomes, and the more likely that tribes will 
take control of these operations, retaining more of the profits. In 
other words, more tribes could choose to simply form, fund, and run 
operations of their own, solely for the benefit of their members, thus 
meeting Kiowa directly. Since even the most improbably one-sided 
state court rulings from the perspective of consumer protection are 
unlikely to provide a stable solution to this problem, we turn below 
to other potential resolutions. 
VI. Potential Solutions to the Problem 
Although access to emergency cash for people in need is 
arguably beneficial, the record on unregulated payday lending 
indicates that the business model is frequently exploitative of a 
vulnerable and often poor population. Yet many, if not most, tribes 
are still in need of fundamental economic development to provide 
basic social services to their members. Tribal options are often 
limited by circumstances thrust upon tribes by history. For some 
                                                                                                     
 200. See WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL, http://www.westernsky.com (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Western Sky Financial is owned wholly by an individual Tribal 
Member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe and is not owned or 
operated by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe or any of its political 
subdivisions. WESTERN SKY FINANCIAL is a Native American 
business operating within the exterior boundaries of the Cheyenne 
River Sioux Reservation, a sovereign nation located within the United 
States of America. 
 201. See supra notes 154–64 and accompanying text (discussing Ameriloan 
v. Super. Ct., 86 Cal. Rptr. 3d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)). 
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tribes, payday lending may be an important means of generating 
income and opportunity. The tribal sovereignty model that allows 
payday lenders to operate without regard to state lending 
regulations is most pernicious when tribes do not get the lion’s share 
of the profits. Since this seems to be the typical case, we view the 
tribal sovereignty model (as it is currently put into practice) more as 
a problem for vulnerable consumers than as a potential solution to 
tribal disadvantage.  
Nevertheless, unless states can prove that an entity is not 
operated and controlled by a tribe, state and circuit courts will lack 
the power to significantly limit use of the tribal sovereign immunity 
avenue.202 Below we explore several other potential solutions to the 
tribal sovereignty model: (1) decisions by tribes themselves to 
regulate or prohibit payday lending; (2) Supreme Court doctrinal 
revision or clarification; (3) congressional action; and (4) agency 
action by either the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau or the 
Federal Trade Commission. 
A. Tribal Regulation or Restraint: Tribes May Choose to Regulate 
Payday Lending or Refrain from Unregulated Payday Lending. 
Tribes can decide for themselves how to address payday 
lending. The decision by a tribe to participate in unregulated payday 
lending, regulate payday lending, or simply forbid payday lending 
by its members and corporations, is a contextualized inquiry that 
each tribe must make independently. This decision will depend 
upon each tribe’s unique culture, laws, tradition, customs, beliefs, 
and economic circumstances. However, there are important reasons 
why a tribe might choose to refrain from engaging in unregulated 
payday lending, especially when a substantial portion of the 
economic benefit is to be siphoned off by outsiders. Tribes can look to 
state payday lending laws for examples of effective regulation, or 
fashion their own forms of regulation. Tribes may wish to form 
coalitions with other tribes in order to strategize about effective laws 
and policies. 
                                                                                                     
 202. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing the notion that 
tribal immunity is a question of jurisdiction and noting the burden of proof rests 
on the party challenging immunity). 
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Conversely, a tribe that engages in unregulated payday lending 
stakes out a de facto position that it opposes regulation designed to 
protect vulnerable consumers. Because the lending entity stands in 
the place of the tribe,203 it is as if the tribe itself is engaging in the 
exploitation of the underprivileged for the sake of profit. Such action 
could tarnish sovereignty. Exploitative payday lending can do 
significant harm to an already vulnerable person or family, and thus 
there is an ethical dimension to tribal participation. As scholar Sam 
Deloria aptly notes, “sovereignty can be used in a way that erodes 
itself.”204  
Use of tribal sovereign immunity to engage in unregulated 
payday lending in contravention of state law might engender a 
backlash, such as that experienced by tribes in 1976–1977, in 
response to non-Indian views that tribes were favored by the federal 
government.205 As Deloria further concludes, in the context of state-
tribal collaboration: 
[R]ecent history shows that the diminutions of tribal sovereignty 
have come from the courts’ responses to tribal unilateral 
assertions of sovereignty or from efforts by individuals to avoid 
sovereignty, in lawsuits that might well have not been brought if 
the situations had been addressed—and managed—by an 
intergovernmental agreement.206 
Tribal sovereign immunity, although not conferred, is not 
absolute. Use of sovereign immunity to evade consumer protection 
laws may be exactly the type of activity referred to in Kiowa as 
having the potential to undermine the congressional rationale for a 
robust sovereign immunity doctrine presumed by the Supreme 
Court.207 Although the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity (as 
                                                                                                     
 203. See Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 F.3d 1044, 1046 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(explaining that when an entity acts as an arm of the tribe, its “activities are 
properly deemed to be those of the tribe,” and providing examples of entities 
found to be acting as an arm of the tribe). 
 204. Sam Deloria, Tassie Hanna & Chuck Trimble, The Commission on 
State-Tribal Relations: Enduring Lessons in the Modern State-Tribal 
Relationship 38 (August 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 205. Id. at 18–19.  
 206. Id. at 38. 
 207. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757–58 (1998). The 
fact that this might be seen as undermining the presumed congressional 
rationale is not an argument for a court’s allowing suit against a tribal entity 
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opposed to sovereignty generally) has thus far expanded 
consistently, the doctrine of tribal territorial sovereignty has, in the 
past, seen a retreat after an expansionary period.208 The use of 
tribal sovereign immunity to escape state regulation as the value in 
a business partnership might attract the attention of Congress or 
the Supreme Court. Once the issue is taken up, congressional 
intervention or binding federal precedent might not be narrowly 
tailored, and tribal sovereign immunity could be hampered beyond 
payday lending. Although tribes make independent decisions with 
regard to the exercise of sovereign immunity, the negative 
consequences of a Supreme Court ruling or congressional 
intervention in this area would affect them all. 
Because of harmful and steady constriction in other realms of 
tribal sovereignty, restriction in the area of tribal sovereign 
immunity has the potential to significantly diminish the ability of 
tribes to make and be controlled by their own laws.209 We do not 
question the right of tribes to utilize sovereign immunity to engage 
in payday lending. Rather, we gently question the wisdom. Although 
unregulated payday lending might be profitable, and a sovereign’s 
responsibility to its people is unquestionably paramount, both 
ethical and practical considerations could cause tribes to 
autonomously reject this opportunity. Because the actions of any 
single tribe could have ramifications for all others, collective action 
on the part of tribes, if possible, may be important. Thus, tribes may 
want to form coalitions and otherwise organize with other tribes in 
order to address payday lending. 
B. The Supreme Court Could Clarify or Revise Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity 
                                                                                                     
engaged in payday lending. The statement in Kiowa was dicta, but the holding 
is firm: a tribal entity—commercial or not, and regardless of whether the 
activity takes place outside of the reservation—shares in the tribe’s sovereign 
immunity. Id. at 760. The analysis focuses on the relationship between the tribe 
and the entity, and cannot judge the type of activity in which the entity is 
engaged. 
 208. Deloria et al., supra note 204, at 15–20; Florey, supra note 80, at 603–
13. 
 209. See Florey, supra note 80, at 640 (explaining that tribal immunity is 
one of the few robust protections remaining for tribal sovereignty). 
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The Supreme Court could clarify the arm-of-the-tribe test, or 
otherwise modify or even eliminate tribal sovereign immunity. 
While the Supreme Court already had an opportunity to clarify the 
arm-of-the-tribe test in Kiowa, and while the unambiguous holding 
in Kiowa allows little room for modification by the Court without 
overturning established precedent, the Court can still overrule 
Kiowa now, particularly in the face of abuses of power. Doing so 
would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s expressed deference to 
Congress in this area, but this does not mean that it will not be 
done. 
Commentators have suggested that the Court shows “no 
inclination to step in” and limit tribal sovereign immunity,210 yet 
recent cases cast doubt on whether the Court truly intends to 
remain uninvolved, deferring indefinitely to Congress. In Madison 
County, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York,211 the 
Court granted certiorari on the question of “whether tribal sovereign 
immunity from suit, to the extent it should continue to be 
recognized, bars taxing authorities from foreclosing.”212 Currently 
before the Court is a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari begging 
specifically that the Supreme Court abrogate the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity altogether.213 These cases show that although 
the law might seem well settled by Kiowa, each time the issue of 
tribal sovereignty is raised in the courts, the risk of radical change is 
presented. Payday lending cases fit squarely into the reasons the 
Kiowa dissent and the majority dicta expressed reservations with 
the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine as a whole.214 Thus, tribally-
                                                                                                     
 210. See id. at 625 (recounting that Congress declined to restrict sovereign 
immunity, and that the Supreme Court has also not made any efforts to do so); 
see also Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity Under Federal Law, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 665–666 (2002) (discussing 
the development of federal policy with respect to tribal immunity and the 
Court’s deference to the legislative and executive branches in this policy area). 
 211. See Madison Cnty., New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, 131 S. Ct. 704, 
704 (2011) (remanding to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit the 
question of whether the Oneida nation had waived its sovereign immunity). 
 212. Id. at 704. 
 213. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at ii, Reed v. Gutierrez, (No. 10-1390), 
2011 WL 1821576 (2011), available at http://www.narf.org/sct/reedvgutierrez/ 
petition_for_cert.pdf. 
 214. See supra notes 112–15 and accompanying text. The dissent points out 
that tribal sovereign immunity doctrine is “unjust” as applied to off-reservation 
commercial conduct and that sovereigns should “be held accountable for their 
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affiliated payday lending presents increased risk to all tribes who 
depend on tribal sovereign immunity as a tool for economic 
development and a buttress to tribal sovereignty. 
C. Congressional Action 
At the time of the decision in Kiowa, Congress was actively 
debating legislation that would have imposed very general 
limitations on tribal sovereign immunity.215 It would not be 
unprecedented for Congress to reconsider and reconstruct the 
contours of tribal sovereign immunity in general. Payday lending, 
and the “tribal sovereignty” model in particular, have recently 
attracted negative attention216—attention that could inspire 
Congress to revisit the issue of tribal sovereign immunity. 
Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs,217 and 
therefore congressional action would be the most definitive of the 
potential solutions to the loophole. Unless held unconstitutional, 
any congressional action would be binding and definitive unless 
superseded by subsequent legislation. Congressional action has the 
benefit of providing certainty and could stem the growth of wasteful 
lawsuits in this area. Congressional intervention would bring 
considerable risk to tribal interests that tribal sovereign immunity 
would be impacted well beyond the specific issue of internet payday 
lending. 
Congressional action would likely be welcomed by a potentially 
powerful, if highly unusual, coalition of consumer protection 
advocates, brick-and-mortar payday lenders,218 states’ rights 
                                                                                                     
unlawful, injurious conduct.” Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 765–66.  
 215. Seielstad, supra note 210, at 711. 
 216. See, e.g., CBS Evening News: How “Payday” Lenders Pull Off Crippling 
Rates (CBS television broadcast Sept. 26, 2011), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/09/26/eveningnews/main20111913.shtml. 
 217. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 44 (1831). 
 218. Brick and mortar payday lenders, who, as a whole, tenaciously fought 
regulation, now view tribally-affiliated lenders who are able to avoid regulation 
as a significant threat. Cf. Wayne Greene, Regulators in Dispute Over Internet 
Payday Loans by Tribes, TULSA WORLD (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.tulsa 
world.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&articleid=20111025_16_A1_Intern4
72461&r=2667 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (explaining the difficulties of 
regulating tribal lenders and the impact of tribal businesses on non-tribal 
lenders) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES 791 
advocates, and those who take a narrow view of Native American 
rights. Some commentators note that when Congress took up the 
issue of tribal immunity around the time of the Kiowa decision, the 
contemplated action would have “effectively eliminate[d] tribal 
sovereign immunity.”219 
Given the potentially broad base of support for the limitation of 
tribal sovereign immunity, and the type of drastic action once 
contemplated by Congress, it is very possible that congressional 
action would carve into tribal immunity more generally than would 
be required in order to simply regulate payday lending. 
Congressional action could clearly establish the contours of the 
tribal sovereignty model, or eliminate it entirely. If Congress acted 
more broadly, it could significantly damage tribal autonomy.  
Hopefully, if Congress does decide to regulate internet payday 
lending, and other products such as similarly-priced internet 
installment loans, Congress will do so narrowly, without abrogating 
more tribal immunity than necessary.  
D. Agency Action 
1. The Federal Trade Commission Could Act 
The Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, one of several Bureaus within the FTC, enforces federal 
laws related to consumer affairs and rules promulgated by the 
FTC.220 Its functions include investigations, enforcement actions, 
and consumer and business education.221 Some of the issues that 
have caught the FTC’s attention include telemarketing fraud, shady 
practices by nursing homes, and identity theft.222 The FTC also 
                                                                                                     
 219. Seielstad, supra note 210, at 711. 
 220. See Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection (Jun. 16, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, Division of Marketing Practices (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc.gov/ 
bcp/bcpmp.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (explaining enforcement efforts 
against telemarketing fraud) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Federal Trade Commission, About the Bureau of Consumer Protection, 
Division of Privacy and Identity Protection (Oct. 23, 2007), http://www.ftc. 
gov/bcp/bcppip.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (outlining some of the 
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oversees online advertising, behavioral targeting, and all issues 
dealing with online privacy concerns.223  
The FTC lacks authority over banks but does have authority 
over payday lenders.224 While accused at times of being toothless or 
doing too little on behalf of consumers generally, recent payday 
lending practices have caught the commissioners’ attention.225 The 
FTC recently sued several lenders, doing business as Lakota Cash 
and Big Sky Cash, who allegedly send documents to their borrowers’ 
employers that mimic a garnishment by the federal government.226 
Federal agencies can garnish without a court order.227 
The FTC has not addressed the fundamental practices of 
payday lending, however, such as charging triple-digit interest rates 
                                                                                                     
Commission’s approach to combating identity theft) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Federal Trade Commission, About the 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, Who Cares: Sources of Information About 
Healthcare Products and Services, Assisted Living and Nursing Homes, 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/whocares/nursinghomes.shtm (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2012) (offering resources to assess services provided by nursing homes) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 223. Areas of principal concern for the FTC are: advertising and marketing, 
financial products and practices, telemarketing fraud, privacy and identity 
protection. See, e.g., supra note 221 and accompanying text; see also Michael D. 
Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach Litigation: 
Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 133 (2008).  
 224. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 41–58 (2012). 
 225. See FTC Action Halts Allegedly Illegal Tactics of Payday Lending 
Operation That Attempted to Garnish Consumers’ Paychecks, Federal Trade 
Commission (Sept. 12, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2011/09/payday.shtm (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2012) (recounting recent FTC suits against payday lenders who 
illegally attempted to garnish borrowers’ wages) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 226. Id.  
 227. See id. The FTC alleges that these lenders illegally revealed consumers’ 
unproven debts to their employers and deprived consumers of their right to 
dispute the debts or make payment arrangements. Id. The complaint further 
alleges that lenders misrepresented to employers that the defendants are legally 
authorized to garnish an employee’s wages, without first obtaining a court 
order; falsely represented to employers that the defendants have notified 
consumers about the pending garnishment and have given them an opportunity 
to dispute the debt; unfairly disclosed the existence and the amounts of 
consumers’ supposed debts to employers and co-workers without the consumers’ 
knowledge or consent; violated the FTC’s Credit Practices Rule by requiring 
consumers taking out payday loans to consent to have wages taken directly out 
of their paychecks in the event of a default; and violated the Electronic Funds 
Transfer Act and Regulation E by requiring authorization for electronic 
payments from their bank account as a condition of obtaining payday loans. Id. 
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for so-called short-term loans that are in reality far from short-term. 
This task, if it is to be taken on, is most likely to be tackled by the 
new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).228  
2. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Could Act 
a. The General Powers of the CFPB 
Leaving aside the issue of whether Congress might act to limit 
sovereign immunity, Congress already has spoken on the issue of 
regulating payday loans in general.229 On July 21, 2010, the Dodd–
Frank Act went into effect, which in turn created the CFPB.230 
While the CFPB cannot set interest rate caps, it clearly has the 
authority to regulate payday loans in other ways. It also appears 
that the CFPB has the power to jettison the tribal-affiliation 
loophole.231  
                                                                                                     
 228. This assumes that federal agencies have the power to regulate tribes, 
an issue about which there is current disagreement. For example, in a case 
dealing with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), administered by 
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, see Donovan v. Navajo 
Forest Products Industries, 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that OSHA 
was not applicable to the Navajo in derogation of the treaty-granted exclusivity) 
and Department of Labor v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n, 
935 F.2d 182 (9th Cir.1991) (holding the opposite with regards to a sawmill 
owned by the Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs). 
 229. This section of the Article borrows extensively from Nathalie Martin, 
Regulating Payday Loans: Why This Should Make the CFPB’S Short List, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 44 (2011).  
 230. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
H.R. 4173, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (July 21, 2010). 
 231. This is not altogether clear. Under the Constitution, Congress is 
granted power over Indian affairs. Congress is, of course, the legislative branch, 
whereas the CPFB—and all agencies—are created by Congress but fall under 
the executive branch. At times, the courts have claimed that even Congress 
must be explicit in its intention to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. See 
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). At other times, it seems 
that the presumption is that congressional Acts of general applicability are 
applicable to Native Americans. See Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 
F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985). With regard to regulatory agencies: the EPA, for 
instance, has been authorized by Congress through specific amendments to 
treat tribes as states with regard to most environmental statutes. In short, the 
question is what Congress has said in the Dodd–Frank Act itself, and how 
explicitly Congress said it. See Dodd–Frank Act. § 1024 (a)(1). If the CFPB’s 
regulations are strongly pro-consumer (and after all, the purpose of the agency 
is to protect consumers), preemption of state laws should become less of an issue 
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Generally speaking, the CFPB is charged with policing 
activities relating to financial products and services for unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive acts or practices,232 and routinely examining 
non-depository entities for compliance with federal consumer 
financial laws.233 The agency has general authority to monitor 
financial products and services for risks to consumers,234 and as part 
of this monitoring function, it may require lenders to file reports and 
participate in interviews and surveys, and also may gather 
information from consumers.235 More importantly, the Act 
specifically prohibits all unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices by covered persons and their service providers.236 The 
CFPB is thus given broad power to make rules and take 
enforcement action with respect to any “unfair, deceptive, or abusive 
act or practice . . . in connection with any transaction with a 
                                                                                                     
because the federal laws will be more rather than less protective that state laws. 
See Jared Elosta, Dynamic Federalism and Consumer Financial Protection: How 
the Dodd–Frank Act Changes the Preemption Debate, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1273, 1273, 
1286–87. Moreover, if a state law is more protective, the CFPB regulation will 
not preempt it. Id. 
 232. See 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2); see also H.R. 4173 § 1021(b)(2). 
 233. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1022(a). The CFPB has 
become the administrator for all “federal consumer financial laws,” which 
include nearly every existing federal consumer financial statute, as well as new 
consumer financial protection mandates prescribed by the Act. 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5481(14) (2012); see also H.R. 4173 § 1002(14). Thus, the CFPB has the 
exclusive authority to promulgate regulations, issue orders, and provide 
guidance to administer the federal consumer financial laws. 
 234. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(c)(1) (2012); see also H.R. 4173 § 1022(c)(2)(A). 
 235. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5512(c)(4)(B)(i) (2012); 12 U.S.C.A. § 5516(b), (c) (2012); 
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (2012); see also H.R. 4173 §§ 1022(c)(4)(B)(1), 1026(b), (c), 
1031. 
 236. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5536 (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1036; see also 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5481(6) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1002(6) (defining a “covered person” as “(A) any 
person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or 
service; and (B) any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such 
affiliate acts as a service provider to such person.”). A “service provider” is a 
person that provides a material service to a covered person in connection with 
the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service. 12 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5481(26) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1002(26). Service providers also may be subject to 
CFPB supervision. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5514(e) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1024(e). Under the 
Act, “person” “means an individual, partnership, company, corporation, 
association (incorporated or unincorporated), trust, estate, cooperative 
organization, or other entity.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5481(19) (2012); H.R. 4173 
§ 1002(19). 
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consumer for a consumer financial product or service, or the offering 
of a consumer financial product or service.”237 
An act or practice is considered “unfair” if it is likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers that cannot be reasonably avoided 
by consumers, whenever this substantial injury is not outweighed 
by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.238 An act 
or practice can be deemed abusive in two different ways. First, it can 
be found to be abusive if it materially interferes with the ability of a 
consumer to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial 
product or service.239 Second, an act can be found to be abusive if it 
takes unreasonable advantage of one of three things: 
1. a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service; or 
2. the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the 
consumer in selecting or using consumer financial products or 
services, and  
3. the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered person to 
act in the interests of the consumer.240  
“Abusive” is defined broadly to include situations in which the 
consumer lacks understanding of a consumer financial product, 
particularly where a covered person’s acts or omissions contribute to 
this lack of understanding.241 This definition might even apply to 
disallow complicated disclosure terms, the provision of terms that 
are not translated to the native language of a consumer, or even an 
agreement that the consumer fully understands, but that the CFPB 
                                                                                                     
 237. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(a). 
 238. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c)(1) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(c)(1). Because this is a 
consumer protection statute, even the benefit to competition must benefit 
consumers. 
 239. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d)(1) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(d)(1). 
 240. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(d)(2) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1031(d)(2). The CFPA 
does not define the term “deceptive,” so the meaning of “deceptive” may be 
construed under § 5 of the FTC Act and the regulations and other guidance of 
the FTC. 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(4)(A) (2012). The Senate report states that the 
existing law prohibits unfair and deceptive practices, suggesting that the term 
is used with the same meaning here. S. Rep. No. 111-176 (2010). 
 241. Michael B. Mierzewski, Beth S. DeSimone, Jeremy W. Hochberg & 
Brian P. Larkin, The Dodd–Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer 
Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products 
and Services, 127 BANKING L. J. 722, 730 (2010). 
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feels is not reasonably in the consumer’s interest.242 Depending on 
how the CFPB interprets the definition of “abusive,” payday lending 
could be forbidden entirely.243 
b. The CFPB and Payday Lending in General 
As set out in the prior section, the CFPB can ban outright any 
product that is either unfair or abusive. The CFPB can also regulate 
all products that have the potential to be abusive or unfair.244 
Payday loans arguably fall within both categories.245 Because these 
loans are most frequently used by people of lesser means246 for non-
emergencies,247 the loans can cause substantial injury that is not 
                                                                                                     
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. Covered persons and their service providers are also required to 
maintain and share information about their practices with the CFPB. 12 
U.S.C.A. § 5536(a)(2) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1036(a)(2). Furthermore, “[a]ny 
person” who knowingly or recklessly provides “substantial assistance” to covered 
persons and service providers who violate these prohibitions will be equally 
liable for the violation. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5536(a)(3) (2012); H.R. 4173 
§ 1036(a)(3). Disclosures must be provided not just at the time of the initial loan, 
but over the term of the relationship, and these disclosures must allow 
consumers “to understand the costs, benefits, and risks associated with the 
product or service.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5532(a) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1032(a). Form 
disclosures must contain “plain language comprehensible to consumers,” have “a 
clear format and design,” explain necessary information “succinctly,” and “be 
validated through consumer testing.” 12 U.S.C.A. § 5532(b)(2)–(3) (2012); H.R. 
4173 § 1032(b)(2)–(3). Large fines can be assessed for non-compliance with these 
requirements. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5565(c) (2012); H.R. 4173 § 1055(c). 
 244. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C.A. § 5511 (2012) (outlining the purposes and 
objectives of the CFPB). 
 245. A practice or product is unfair if it is likely to cause substantial injury 
to consumers that cannot be reasonably avoided, whenever this substantial 
injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 
12 U.S.C.A. § 5531(c) (2012). While consumers could arguably avoid substantial 
injury from payday loans by using them less frequently and not rolling them 
over, the CFPB could still target payday lenders for unfair or abusive practices 
because such lenders rely on tactics that hinder these potential protective 
measures by consumers and instead make sure consumers use their products 
continuously. 
 246. Francis, supra note 25, at 613; see also John P. Caskey, supra note 33, 
at 3 (noting that payday lenders serve people of lesser means but not the very 
poor).  
 247. See Martin, supra note 27, at 608–09 (showing that few payday 
borrowers said they used the loans for emergency expenses; most used the loans 
for regular bills). 
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outweighed by a countervailing benefit. Enforcing this part of the 
Act requires the CFPB to ask specifically whether the loan’s cost is 
worth what the consumer pays for it over the full life of the loan.248 
Lending practices suggest that lenders do take unreasonable 
advantage of consumers’ lack of knowledge of the loan terms.249 
Lenders also encourage borrowing whenever possible and 
discourage paying off the loans.250 
Customers also have various behavioral biases, including 
optimism bias and framing.251 There is also much more at stake for 
                                                                                                     
 248. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (2012). A product is abusive if it “materially 
interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand a term or condition of a 
consumer financial product or service” or “takes unreasonable advantage” of one 
of the following: (1) “a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the 
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service”; (2) “the inability of 
the consumer to protect the interests of the consumer in selecting or using a 
consumer financial product or service”; or (3) “the reasonable reliance by the 
consumer on a covered person to act in the interests of the consumer.” Id. 
§ 5531(d). Only one of these three conditions is required to find an act or product 
abusive, and in this instance at least two of the three conditions are satisfied. 
 249. There is tremendous subterfuge of the actual terms of payday loans, as 
is true in so many consumer-lending contexts today. Yet subterfuge in payday 
lending causes more individual harm than subterfuge in other contexts. It is 
difficult to calculate the actual costs of these products over time, up front, given 
that the loans are short term and interest-only, but usually renewed and rolled 
into a new loan. 
 250. This is particularly a problem with internet payday loans, in which the 
lender often just takes out the interest on the loan automatically, creating no 
easy way to pay off the whole loan. See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., CFA SURVEY OF 
ONLINE PAYDAY LOAN WEBSITES 9 (reporting on a 2011 study and stating that 
online loans are often structured to automatically withdraw only the finance 
charge and continue the loan for another pay cycle). Nor is this a new problem. 
A 2004 study by the Consumer Federation of America explains how this is done, 
which was then described on a government web site: 
Although loans are due on the borrower's next payday, many 
surveyed sites automatically renew the loan, withdrawing the finance 
charge from the borrower's bank account and extending the loan for 
another pay cycle. Sixty-five [of 100] of the surveyed sites permit loan 
renewals with no reduction in principal. At some lenders, consumers 
have to take additional steps to actually repay the loan. After several 
renewals, some lenders require borrowers to reduce the loan principal 
with each renewal. 
Robert Longley, Consumers Warned of Online Payday Loan Sites, ABOUT.GOV 
U.S. GOVERNMENT INFO, http://usgovinfo.about.com/od/consumerawareness/a/pay 
dayloans.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 251. Regarding the influence of framing, because consumers are used to 
hearing interest rates stated in terms of twenty to twenty-five percent, they 
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them in taking out these loans, which ultimately represent a huge 
percentage of their overall cash flow. The costs are high by any 
standard, but by the average payday loan customer’s standard, they 
are excessive beyond imagination.252  
Another step the CFPB can take is to conclusively prohibit the 
use of wage assignments and demand drafts for payday loans, 
closing one arguable loophole in the Electronic Funds Transfer 
Act.253 
c. The CFPB and Tribes 
The CFPB applies to Native Americans as consumers. It was 
formed to protect all Americans from abusive lending practices.254 
The U.S. Treasury’s web site contains a detailed memo regarding 
how the CFPB applies to Native Americans and why the issue is 
important.255 Though this memo does not carry the force of law, it is 
an indication of the CFPB’s intent. As the Treasury memo explains, 
Native Americans are more likely to use alternative financial 
services than other Americans.256  
                                                                                                     
believe that twenty percent over two weeks also equals twenty percent per 
annum.  
 252. Additionally, consumers cannot protect their interests because the true 
terms of the loans are often hidden from consumers at the point of sale. Finally, 
consumers cannot protect their interests because all of the products are offered 
under the same or similar unfavorable terms. The market is simply not working. 
Considering all of the above, it is hard to picture a product more likely to fit 
within these definitions of unfair and abusive than a payday loan. 
 253. See, e.g., Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1693(a). 
 254. Some commentators suspect that the CFPB will focus on store-front 
payday lenders while continuing to ignore tribally-affiliated internet lenders. 
See Natasha Mayer, The Free-Market Bandits, THE DAILY CALLER (Feb. 23, 2011, 
2:58 PM), http://dailycaller.com/2011/02/22/the-free-market-bandits/ (last visited 
Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 255. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act Benefits Native Americans (Jan. 26, 2011), 
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Pages/Native-Americans.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 256. The Treasury memorandum further explains the applicability of the 
CFPB’s regulations to Native families: 
For Native American families using alternative financial 
services: The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
establishes, for the first time, robust federal supervision and 
oversight over larger alternative financial service companies such as 
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Moreover, as established in Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal 
Farm,257 and other cases,258 federal regulations apply to Native 
American tribes and may be enforced by the federal government. In 
Coeur d’Alene, the Coeur D’Alene Tribe argued that it was not 
subject to Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 
requirements as a result of tribal immunity.259 The Tribe operated a 
farm that produced grain and lentils for sale on the open market, 
and employed both tribal and non-tribal members.260 After an 
inspection, the Tribe was cited for twenty-one violations of OSHA.261 
The farm did not dispute the facts but argued that OSHA did not 
apply to them because of tribal immunity.262  
                                                                                                     
check cashers and payday lenders, including on reservations. The 
CFPB will be able to combat abusive practices that harm consumers, 
helping families avoid hidden fees and keep more money in their 
pocketbooks.  
Id. As for minorities in general, an analysis of the 2007 Survey of Consumer 
Finances by the Center for American Progress found that “[t]hirty-eight percent 
of families who has borrowed a payday loan within the last year were nonwhite 
while just twenty-two percent of families who did not take out such a loan were 
nonwhite.”  Amanda Logan and Christian E. Weller, Who Borrows From Payday 
Lenders?: An Analysis of Newly Available Data, CENTER FOR AMERICAN 
PROGRESS (March 2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
2009/03/pdf/payday_lending.pdf. As for Native Americans specifically, a survey 
of attendees at a National American Indian Housing Council meeting found that 
at least half of respondents believed that the following alternative financial 
services were a problem in their communities: loans against tax refunds (sixty-
eight percent), payday loans (sixty-seven percent), pawn shops (fifty-eight 
percent), and car title loans (fifty percent). 
 257. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that the OSHA applied to commercial activities carried on by an Indian 
tribal farm). 
 258. See Florida Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 
1126, 1127, 1129–30 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying the Americans with Disabilities 
Act to a tribal restaurant and holding that although private suit was barred by 
sovereign immunity, the Attorney General of the United States could bring 
actions against the tribe); San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino, 475 F.3d 1306 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (construing the National Labor Relations Act as applying to 
tribe); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1989) (applying 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act to group insurance policy issued to 
Indian-owned hospital); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545, 547 (10th 
Cir. 1986) (finding that the Safe Drinking Water Act may be imposed in Indian 
country). 
 259. Donovan, 751 F.2d at 1115.  
 260. Id. at 1114.  
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. at 1114–15.  
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Holding that generally applicable federal law applies equally to 
tribes and everyone else, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
established three exceptions to the rule.263 The court held that a 
“federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of 
applicability to Indian tribes” will not apply to tribes if: “(1) the law 
touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural 
matters’; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would ‘abrogate 
rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’; or (3) there is proof ‘by 
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the 
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.’”264 In any of these 
three situations, Congress must expressly state that a law applies to 
native people before the court will apply that law to native 
communities or individuals.265  
i. Interference with Tribal Self-Government 
The first prong of the Coeur d’Alene test asks whether the 
applicability of the federal law in question would interfere with 
rights of tribal self-government.266 If so, the federal law cannot be 
applied to tribes unless there is a “clear” expression of congressional 
intent that the law should apply to tribes.267 In Coeur d’Alene, 
applying OSHA, the court found that interpreting this exception as 
broadly as the tribe argued would except all tribal businesses from 
federal regulation. The court stated: 
[I]f the right to conduct commercial enterprises free of federal 
regulation is an aspect of tribal self-government, so too, it would 
seem, is the right to run a tribal enterprise free of the potentially 
ruinous burden of federal taxes. Yet our cases make clear that 
federal taxes apply to reservation activities even without a “clear” 
expression of congressional intent.268 
The court went on to say, “we believe that the tribal self-government 
exception is designed to except purely intramural matters such as 
conditions of tribal membership, inheritance rules, and domestic 
                                                                                                     
 263. Id. at 1115–16.  
 264. Id. at 1116 (emphasis added). 
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. (citations omitted). 
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relations from the general rule that otherwise applicable federal 
statutes apply to Indian tribes” engaging in regulated open market 
commerce.269  
ii. The “Treaty Rights” Exception 
The tribe next argued that OSHA cannot apply to a tribe’s 
activities absent a clear expression of congressional intent because 
application of the Act would infringe on treaty rights.270 Because the 
court found no treaty at all between the Coeur d’Alene tribe and the 
United States, it found that the second exception did not apply 
either.271  
iii. The “Other Indications” Exception 
As set out above, if neither of the first two exceptions apply, 
there is a third, catch-all exception for situations in which Congress 
expressed explicit intent that the law not apply to tribes.272 This 
exception asks whether the legislative history surrounding the law 
in question (in Coeur d’Alene it was OSHA) indicates any 
congressional desire to exclude tribal enterprises from the scope of 
its coverage.273 This exception requires that there be express intent 
to exclude tribes. 
In applying Coeur d’Alene to the CFPB’s regulations, there is no 
question that the Dodd–Frank Act that created the CFPB is a law of 
general applicability. This means the CFPB’s regulations apply as 
long as none of the three exceptions set out in Coeur d’Alene 
apply.274 None of these exceptions appear to apply to internet 
payday lending. As in Coeur d’Alene, the business in question here 
is in regular commerce, and there is nothing about regulating 
payday lending that bears upon tribal membership, inheritance 
                                                                                                     
 269. Id. The tribe also argued that the inspector’s presence interfered with 
the tribe’s immunity, but the Court disagreed. See id. at 1116–17. 
 270. Id. at 1117.  
 271. Id. at 1117–18.  
 272. Id. at 1116.  
 273. Id. at 1118.  
 274. Id. at 1115–16.  
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rules, and domestic relations, or any other internal governance 
matter.275 Moreover, unlike Coeur d’Alene, there is no intrusion onto 
tribal land at all, as the CFPB will likely be regulating internet 
lending, not store-front lending.276 As to prong two, like Coeur 
d’Alene, at least in the cases identified thus far, there is no treaty 
between the United States and the tribes involved in internet 
payday lending. Finally, there is no express intent here for the 
CFPB to exclude tribes or native people. To the contrary, as the 
Treasury memorandum indicates, there was express intent for the 
exact opposite, namely, for the CFPB to apply equally to tribes and 
everyone else.277 
In summary, federal laws of general application apply to tribes 
and can be enforced by the federal government unless one of the 
Coeur d’Alene factors applies.278 Thus, if nothing else, the CFPB is 
in a position to outlaw or limit internet payday lending in general, 
regardless of who is doing the lending. Given the difficulties created 
by the sovereign immunity model, as well as off-shore lending 
models, the role of the CFPB is critical. 
The CFPB’s investigative powers could also be very useful to 
the offices of state attorneys general in thwarting the overarching 
participation of non-immune, non-tribal financiers (such as Mr. 
Tucker) in this market, who should be targeted.  State attorneys 
general will have access to CFPB investigations of tribes pursuant 
to memoranda of understanding required by Dodd-Frank to pursue 
the non-tribal financiers of tribal lending entities under state law as 
aiders, abettors, conspirators, or control persons. 
Tribal immunity does not make tribal lending in contravention 
of state law legal, but it does make tribes immune from prosecution. 
It will likely be more effective for attorneys general to not join the 
tribes as defendants in order to pursue non-tribal defendants in 
illegal lending schemes. Using the CFPB’s investigative and 
enforcement actions, no change in law or interpretation is required 
                                                                                                     
 275. Id. at 1116 (explaining that the tribal self-government exception is 
intended to apply to matters such as those listed in the text above). 
 276. As the court noted, the regulators would not need to enter reservation 
land, but even if they did, this would not be not interference under Coeur 
d’Alene. See id. at 1116–17. 
 277. See U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 256.  
 278. See WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 282–
86 (4th ed. 2004). 
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for this attorney general action to take place. The CFPB, however, 
would need to take an immediate and active role in investigating 
online payday lending. 
VII.  Conclusion: Who Loses When Sovereignty Is Sold? 
Sovereignty is the linchpin of tribal self-determination.279 
Scholars are already concerned that broadening sovereign 
immunity to off-reservation business enterprises will cause the 
Supreme Court and Congress to limit that immunity, particularly 
where the immunity extends to non-Indians.280 Indeed, the 
Supreme Court may already be reevaluating its stance toward tribal 
immunity,281 a step in the wrong direction for tribes.282 There has 
been marked and insidious erosion in tribal sovereignty as it relates 
to tribal territory since Kiowa. This development is so pronounced 
that it might outweigh the significant benefits tribal economic 
development has brought to tribes.283 Tribal payday lending could 
further erode this sovereignty. 
Courts, litigants, and scholars continue to challenge the 
fairness of corporate immunity for casinos and other businesses that 
compete in the economic mainstream.284 Thus far, the Supreme 
Court has somewhat begrudgingly continued to recognize broad 
tribal immunity in the commercial context, though the precise 
parameters of sovereign immunity in the business context remain 
undefined. Tribes need not allow these parameters to lie in the 
                                                                                                     
 279. See S. Chloe Thompson, Exercising and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty in 
Day-to-Day Business Operations: What the Key Players Need to Know, 49 
WASHBURN L.J. 661, 661 (2010). 
 280. See id. at 661–662; Kunesh, supra note 138, at 398; Charles Trimble, 
Sovereignty for Rent with Payday Loan Businesses, INDIANZ.COM (Mar. 14, 2011), 
http://64.38.12.138/News/2011/000756.asp (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 281. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism: The 
Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE L.J. 
1, 7 (1999); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New 
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1574 
(1996); Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38 CONN. L. REV. 
797, 797 (2006); Kunesh, supra note 138, at 398. 
 282. Getches, supra note 281, at 1574.  
 283. Thompson, supra note 279, at 661. 
 284. Id. at 664–65. 
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hands of random courts, the Supreme Court, or Congress. Rather, 
they can take things into their own hands and regulate or forbid 
payday lending by their members and corporate entities. 
Tension about the extent of tribal sovereign immunity is 
evident in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. For example in 
Kiowa, Justice Stevens’s dissent expressed serious doubts about the 
legal premise and fairness of tribal immunity from suit for off-
reservation commercial activities.285 Justice Stevens claimed that 
sovereign immunity in the context of commercial activity is unjust, 
adding that “[g]overnments, like individuals, should pay their debts 
and should be held accountable for their unlawful, injurious 
conduct.”286 
Some tribal members recognize the risk in selling sovereignty 
too cheaply. As Charles Trimble, a member of the Oglala Sioux 
tribe, stated on his popular Native American blog: 
[Payday lending] is fodder for those forces that still argue that 
tribes are not up to the standards of discipline and law for 
sovereignty and self-governance. Instead they are seen by many 
as havens of corruption and lawlessness, and fronts for sleazy 
businesses. These are the things that could feed a backlash; and 
as I have written before, even if our sovereignty is secure, those 
forces could make it more difficult to exercise it for the good of our 
people. 
For example, anti-tribal forces could push Congress to just extend 
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s requirement for state-tribal 
compacts for other non-gaming businesses. Or ultra-conservative 
budget cutters could use the excuse of not wanting to promote 
state law circumvention by subsidizing the payday lenders 
through the tribes.287 
He added that “[t]here is great dignity in sovereignty and great 
discipline is needed for its preservation.”288 Similarly, Professor 
Patrice Kunesh suggests that tribes remain mindful that 
“improvident use of tribal sovereign immunity may impede 
actualization of full tribal self-determination and obstruct ultimate 
tribal vindication of important legal rights.”289 With immunity 
                                                                                                     
 285. See Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 760–66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 286. Id. at 766. 
 287. Trimble, supra note 280. 
 288. Id.  
 289. See Kunesh, supra note 138, at 416; see also Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal 
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comes great power, which, if overused, can backfire.290 Given the 
power of Congress, the Supreme Court, the FTC, and the CFPB, 
tribes may find good reasons to steer clear of these partnerships 
entirely, or to closely regulate them. 
                                                                                                     
Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777, 791 (2006) 
(“Militant and inflexible assertions of tribal sovereignty may be emotionally 
satisfying, and they may, frankly, be more consistent with fundamental notions 
of truth and justice. But strong expressions of ‘sovereignty’ seem to come up 
hollow in so many Supreme Court cases.”). 
 290. Another commentator, who represents tribes in various business 
enterprises, adds further suggestions and cautions. Recognizing that 
sovereignty is more likely challenged when tribes have different laws than the 
rest of society, she suggests that when enacting laws, tribes consider enacting 
laws similar to those found in the rest of society. See Thompson, supra note 279, 
at 679–80. Doing so will result in less conflict of laws analyses as well as fewer 
overall immunity challenges and thus less risk of further chipping away at 
immunity. Id. at 680. Next she recommends that when enacting laws, tribes try 
to enact laws that are facially fair and reasonable because this too will reduce 
the likelihood that sovereign immunity claims will arise. Id. at 681–82. Finally, 
and more relevant here, she recommends that tribes concerned with protecting 
immunity think very hard about when such immunity should apply to non-tribal 
members. Stating that applying immunity to non-members “increases the 
likelihood of challenges to the Tribe’s authority,” she suggests serious thought 
about when to take such actions. Id. at 682.  Professor Kunesh advises that any 
sovereign immunity be used with “fairness, responsiveness and transparency.” 
Kunesh, supra note 138, at 416. Noting how fact-specific sovereign immunity 
can be, she adds that “in this complex legal and policy-orientated matrix, every 
variable matters. The status of the parties and their political and legal 
relationship to the tribe, such as tribal member, nonmember, reservation 
resident or itinerant patron, business partner or financier must be considered.” 
Id. at 418.  
